40 ideas
11051 | Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna] |
11054 | Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna] |
11070 | 'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna] |
11071 | 'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna] |
11088 | We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna] |
11059 | Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna] |
11089 | Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna] |
11058 | Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna] |
11072 | Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna] |
11061 | Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna] |
11063 | Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna] |
15200 | How could change consist of a conjunction of changeless facts? [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
14761 | Change is not just having two different qualities at different points in some series [McTaggart] |
11055 | Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna] |
22628 | Substance has to exist, with no intrinsic qualities or relations [McTaggart] |
11083 | A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna] |
11086 | Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna] |
11084 | Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna] |
11085 | Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna] |
11077 | Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna] |
11080 | Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna] |
11078 | Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna] |
11053 | Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna] |
11081 | Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna] |
11082 | Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna] |
11067 | Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna] |
11068 | One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna] |
11047 | Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna] |
11048 | Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna] |
11046 | Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna] |
11045 | Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna] |
9381 | If some inferences are needed to fix meaning, but we don't know which, they are all relevant [Fodor/Lepore, by Boghossian] |
2608 | For McTaggart time is seen either as fixed, or as relative to events [McTaggart, by Ayer] |
22936 | A-series time positions are contradictory, and yet all events occupy all of them! [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
4231 | Time involves change, only the A-series explains change, but it involves contradictions, so time is unreal [McTaggart, by Lowe] |
8591 | There could be no time if nothing changed [McTaggart] |
22935 | The B-series can be inferred from the A-series, but not the other way round [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
7802 | A-series uses past, present and future; B-series uses 'before' and 'after' [McTaggart, by Girle] |
4230 | A-series expressions place things in time, and their truth varies; B-series is relative, and always true [McTaggart, by Lowe] |
15199 | The B-series must depend on the A-series, because change must be explained [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |