8 ideas
8942 | Lukasiewicz's L3 logic has three truth-values, T, F and I (for 'indeterminate') [Lukasiewicz, by Fisher] |
9381 | If some inferences are needed to fix meaning, but we don't know which, they are all relevant [Fodor/Lepore, by Boghossian] |
2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |
2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |
2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |