326 ideas
| 2196 | The observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy [Hume] |
| 2187 | If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from [Hume] |
| 2200 | All experimental conclusions assume that the future will be like the past [Hume] |
| 3807 | Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions [Hume] |
| 6961 | An analogy begins to break down as soon as the two cases differ [Hume] |
| 4636 | All reasoning concerning matters of fact is based on analogy (with similar results of similar causes) [Hume] |
| 8625 | What physical facts could underlie 0 or 1, or very large numbers? [Frege on Mill] |
| 17895 | Combining two distinct assertions does not necessarily lead to a single 'complex proposition' [Mill] |
| 10427 | All names are names of something, real or imaginary [Mill] |
| 4944 | Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Mill, by Kripke] |
| 7762 | Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Mill, by Lycan] |
| 9801 | Numbers must be assumed to have identical units, as horses are equalised in 'horse-power' [Mill] |
| 8742 | The only axioms needed are for equality, addition, and successive numbers [Mill, by Shapiro] |
| 9800 | Arithmetic is based on definitions, and Sums of equals are equal, and Differences of equals are equal [Mill] |
| 8649 | Two numbers are equal if all of their units correspond to one another [Hume] |
| 2197 | Reason assists experience in discovering laws, and in measuring their application [Hume] |
| 5201 | Mill says logic and maths is induction based on a very large number of instances [Mill, by Ayer] |
| 9360 | If two black and two white objects in practice produced five, what colour is the fifth one? [Lewis,CI on Mill] |
| 9888 | Mill mistakes particular applications as integral to arithmetic, instead of general patterns [Dummett on Mill] |
| 9794 | There are no such things as numbers in the abstract [Mill] |
| 9796 | Things possess the properties of numbers, as quantity, and as countable parts [Mill] |
| 9795 | Numbers have generalised application to entities (such as bodies or sounds) [Mill] |
| 9798 | Different parcels made from three pebbles produce different actual sensations [Mill] |
| 9797 | '2 pebbles and 1 pebble' and '3 pebbles' name the same aggregation, but different facts [Mill] |
| 9799 | 3=2+1 presupposes collections of objects ('Threes'), which may be divided thus [Mill] |
| 9802 | Numbers denote physical properties of physical phenomena [Mill] |
| 9803 | We can't easily distinguish 102 horses from 103, but we could arrange them to make it obvious [Mill] |
| 9804 | Arithmetical results give a mode of formation of a given number [Mill] |
| 9805 | 12 is the cube of 1728 means pebbles can be aggregated a certain way [Mill] |
| 8741 | Numbers must be of something; they don't exist as abstractions [Mill] |
| 12411 | Mill is too imprecise, and is restricted to simple arithmetic [Kitcher on Mill] |
| 5656 | Empirical theories of arithmetic ignore zero, limit our maths, and need probability to get started [Frege on Mill] |
| 9624 | Numbers are a very general property of objects [Mill, by Brown,JR] |
| 21291 | There is no medium state between existence and non-existence [Hume] |
| 7700 | We can't think about the abstract idea of triangles, but only of particular triangles [Hume] |
| 11942 | Power is the possibility of action, as discovered by experience [Hume] |
| 11949 | There may well be powers in things, with which we are quite unacquainted [Hume] |
| 11950 | We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them [Hume] |
| 11941 | The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous [Hume] |
| 13602 | We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning [Hume] |
| 11098 | Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance [Hume, by Quine] |
| 7954 | If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences [Hume] |
| 21293 | Individuation is only seeing that a thing is stable and continuous over time [Hume] |
| 12048 | The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities [Hume] |
| 13424 | Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them [Hume] |
| 9806 | Whatever is made up of parts is made up of parts of those parts [Mill] |
| 11156 | The essence is that without which a thing can neither be, nor be conceived to be [Mill] |
| 21300 | A change more obviously destroys an identity if it is quick and observed [Hume] |
| 21299 | Changing a part can change the whole, not absolutely, but by its proportion of the whole [Hume] |
| 1330 | If a republic can retain identity through many changes, so can an individual [Hume] |
| 1321 | If identity survives change or interruption, then resemblance, contiguity or causation must unite the parts of it [Hume] |
| 21302 | If a ruined church is rebuilt, its relation to its parish makes it the same church [Hume] |
| 21303 | We accept the identity of a river through change, because it is the river's nature [Hume] |
| 21301 | The purpose of the ship makes it the same one through all variations [Hume] |
| 21290 | Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different [Hume] |
| 1207 | Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity [Hume] |
| 21289 | 'An object is the same with itself' is meaningless; it expresses unity, not identity [Hume] |
| 21292 | Saying an object is the same with itself is only meaningful over a period of time [Hume] |
| 12190 | Necessity is what will be, despite any alternative suppositions whatever [Mill] |
| 22623 | Necessity can only mean what must be, without conditions of any kind [Mill] |
| 9428 | Nothing we clearly imagine is absolutely impossible [Hume] |
| 4766 | Necessity only exists in the mind, and not in objects [Hume] |
| 2216 | We transfer the frequency of past observations to our future predictions [Hume] |
| 2215 | There is no such thing as chance [Hume] |
| 2209 | Belief is stronger, clearer and steadier than imagination [Hume] |
| 2207 | Belief can't be a concept plus an idea, or we could add the idea to fictions [Hume] |
| 2208 | Belief is just a particular feeling attached to ideas of objects [Hume] |
| 2213 | Beliefs are built up by resemblance, contiguity and causation [Hume] |
| 20189 | Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume] |
| 3661 | 'Natural beliefs' are unavoidable, whatever our judgements [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
| 6526 | Hume says objects are not a construction, but an imaginative leap [Hume, by Robinson,H] |
| 3583 | External objects are permanent possibilities of sensation [Mill] |
| 2191 | Relations of ideas are known by thought, independently from the world [Hume] |
| 2239 | If secondary qualities (e.g. hardness) are in the mind, so are primary qualities like extension [Hume] |
| 2237 | It never occurs to people that they only experience representations, not the real objects [Hume] |
| 16859 | Most perception is one-tenth observation and nine-tenths inference [Mill] |
| 2192 | All reasoning about facts is causal; nothing else goes beyond memory and senses [Hume] |
| 21309 | A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume] |
| 2184 | All ideas are copies of impressions [Hume] |
| 23631 | Hume is loose when he says perceptions of different strength are different species [Reid on Hume] |
| 2182 | Impressions are our livelier perceptions, Ideas the less lively ones [Hume] |
| 2190 | All objects of enquiry are Relations of Ideas, or Matters of Fact [Hume] |
| 2246 | If books don't relate ideas or explain facts, commit them to the flames [Hume] |
| 2189 | All ideas are connected by Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect [Hume] |
| 6489 | Associationism results from having to explain intentionality just with sense-data [Robinson,H on Hume] |
| 2194 | How could Adam predict he would drown in water or burn in fire? [Hume] |
| 2183 | We can only invent a golden mountain by combining experiences [Hume] |
| 21285 | Events are baffling before experience, and obvious after experience [Hume] |
| 9082 | Clear concepts result from good observation, extensive experience, and accurate memory [Mill] |
| 2205 | You couldn't reason at all if you lacked experience [Hume] |
| 2186 | We cannot form the idea of something we haven't experienced [Hume] |
| 2702 | Only madmen dispute the authority of experience [Hume] |
| 2217 | When definitions are pushed to the limit, only experience can make them precise [Hume] |
| 23421 | If a person had a gap in their experience of blue shades, they could imaginatively fill it in [Hume] |
| 3902 | Hume mistakenly lumps sensations and perceptions together as 'impressions' [Scruton on Hume] |
| 6182 | Even Hume didn't include mathematics in his empiricism [Hume, by Kant] |
| 2206 | Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation [Hume] |
| 2235 | There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference [Hume] |
| 10328 | We think testimony matches reality because of experience, not some a priori connection [Hume] |
| 2230 | Good testimony needs education, integrity, motive and agreement [Hume, by PG] |
| 12417 | Mathematicians only accept their own proofs when everyone confims them [Hume] |
| 2238 | Reason can never show that experiences are connected to external objects [Hume] |
| 2242 | Mitigated scepticism draws attention to the limitations of human reason, and encourages modesty [Hume] |
| 2243 | Mitigated scepticism sensibly confines our enquiries to the narrow capacity of human understanding [Hume] |
| 5548 | Hume became a total sceptic, because he believed that reason was a deception [Hume, by Kant] |
| 2236 | Examples of illusion only show that sense experience needs correction by reason [Hume] |
| 2240 | It is a very extravagant aim of the sceptics to destroy reason and argument by means of reason and argument [Hume] |
| 2241 | The main objection to scepticism is that no good can come of it [Hume] |
| 16860 | Inductive generalisation is more reliable than one of its instances; they can't all be wrong [Mill] |
| 7446 | The idea of inductive evidence, around 1660, made Hume's problem possible [Hume, by Hacking] |
| 16845 | The whole theory of induction rests on causes [Mill] |
| 16843 | Mill's methods (Difference,Agreement,Residues,Concomitance,Hypothesis) don't nail induction [Mill, by Lipton] |
| 2198 | We assume similar secret powers behind similar experiences, such as the nourishment of bread [Hume] |
| 2201 | Induction can't prove that the future will be like the past, since induction assumes this [Hume] |
| 2203 | If we infer causes from repetition, this explains why we infer from a thousand objects what we couldn't infer from one [Hume] |
| 2204 | All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not reasoning [Hume] |
| 2199 | Reason cannot show why reliable past experience should extend to future times and remote places [Hume] |
| 2202 | Fools, children and animals all learn from experience [Hume] |
| 6350 | Premises can support an argument without entailing it [Pollock/Cruz on Hume] |
| 3598 | Hume just shows induction isn't deduction [Williams,M on Hume] |
| 17086 | Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben] |
| 17091 | Explanation is fitting of facts into ever more general patterns of regularity [Mill, by Ruben] |
| 16805 | Causal inference is by spotting either Agreements or Differences [Mill, by Lipton] |
| 16835 | The Methods of Difference and of Agreement are forms of inference to the best explanation [Mill, by Lipton] |
| 3537 | I judge others' feeling by analogy with my body and behaviour [Mill] |
| 21806 | Memory, senses and understanding are all founded on the imagination [Hume] |
| 9079 | We can focus our minds on what is common to a whole class, neglecting other aspects [Mill] |
| 2210 | A picture of a friend strengthens our idea of him, by resemblance [Hume] |
| 15755 | Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume] |
| 17712 | General ideas are the connection by resemblance to some particular [Hume] |
| 8544 | Hume does not distinguish real resemblances among degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume] |
| 9081 | We don't recognise comparisons by something in our minds; the concepts result from the comparisons [Mill] |
| 2211 | When I am close to (contiguous with) home, I feel its presence more nearly [Hume] |
| 2212 | An object made by a saint is the best way to produce thoughts of him [Hume] |
| 2214 | Our awareness of patterns of causation is too important to be left to slow and uncertain reasoning [Hume] |
| 5323 | Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume] |
| 3819 | Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle on Hume] |
| 1317 | A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions [Hume] |
| 1331 | The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume] |
| 1388 | Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume] |
| 21297 | A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions [Hume] |
| 1316 | Introspection always discovers perceptions, and never a Self without perceptions [Hume] |
| 1333 | Memory only reveals personal identity, by showing cause and effect [Hume] |
| 1332 | We use memory to infer personal actions we have since forgotten [Hume] |
| 21305 | Memory not only reveals identity, but creates it, by producing resemblances [Hume] |
| 21307 | Who thinks that because you have forgotten an incident you are no longer that person? [Hume] |
| 21306 | Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other [Hume] |
| 21311 | Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume] |
| 21312 | Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume] |
| 21294 | A continuous lifelong self must be justified by a single sustained impression, which we don't have [Hume] |
| 21295 | When I introspect I can only observe my perceptions, and never a self which has them [Hume] |
| 21298 | We pretend our perceptions are continuous, and imagine a self to fill the gaps [Hume] |
| 21304 | Identity in the mind is a fiction, like that fiction that plants and animals stay the same [Hume] |
| 21308 | We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume] |
| 21310 | Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume] |
| 2222 | The doctrine of free will arises from a false sensation we have of freedom in many actions [Hume] |
| 2223 | Liberty is merely acting according to the will, which anyone can do if they are not in chains [Hume] |
| 3655 | Hume makes determinism less rigid by removing the necessity from causation [Trusted on Hume] |
| 9080 | General conceptions are a necessary preliminary to Induction [Mill] |
| 9078 | The study of the nature of Abstract Ideas does not belong to logic, but to a different science [Mill] |
| 9381 | If some inferences are needed to fix meaning, but we don't know which, they are all relevant [Fodor/Lepore, by Boghossian] |
| 20030 | If one event causes another, the two events must be wholly distinct [Hume, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 3772 | The will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire [Mill] |
| 2220 | Only experience teaches us about our wills [Hume] |
| 6692 | For Hume, practical reason has little force, because we can always modify our desires [Hume, by Graham] |
| 8257 | Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will [Hume] |
| 22374 | You can only hold people responsible for actions which arise out of their character [Hume] |
| 2224 | Praise and blame can only be given if an action proceeds from a person's character and disposition [Hume] |
| 21103 | Moral questions can only be decided by common opinion [Hume] |
| 18552 | Forget about beauty; just concentrate on the virtues of delicacy and discernment admired in critics [Hume, by Scruton] |
| 6608 | Strong sense, delicate sentiment, practice, comparisons, and lack of prejudice, are all needed for good taste [Hume] |
| 2225 | If you deny all necessity and causation, then our character is not responsible for our crime [Hume] |
| 2226 | Repentance gets rid of guilt, which shows that responsibility arose from the criminal principles in the mind [Hume] |
| 7222 | It is a crime for someone with a violent disposition to get drunk [Mill] |
| 3769 | With early training, any absurdity or evil may be given the power of conscience [Mill] |
| 22382 | We cannot discover vice by studying a wilful murder; that only arises from our own feelings [Hume] |
| 4008 | Modern science has destroyed the Platonic synthesis of scientific explanation and morality [Hume, by Taylor,C] |
| 8067 | The problem of getting to 'ought' from 'is' would also apply in getting to 'owes' or 'needs' [Anscombe on Hume] |
| 4578 | You can't move from 'is' to 'ought' without giving some explanation or reason for the deduction [Hume] |
| 4581 | Virtues and vices are like secondary qualities in perception, found in observers, not objects [Hume] |
| 3926 | The human heart has a natural concern for public good [Hume] |
| 23115 | We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume] |
| 3650 | Total selfishness is not irrational [Hume] |
| 3767 | Motive shows the worth of the agent, but not of the action [Mill] |
| 7076 | Mill wondered if he would be happy if all his aims were realised, and answered no [Mill, by Critchley] |
| 3929 | No moral theory is of any use if it doesn't serve the interests of the individual concerned [Hume] |
| 3925 | Personal Merit is the possession of useful or agreeable mental qualities [Hume] |
| 3771 | Virtues only have value because they achieve some further end [Mill] |
| 4580 | All virtues benefit either the public, or the individual who possesses them [Hume] |
| 3922 | Justice only exists to support society [Hume] |
| 23560 | If we all naturally had everything we could ever desire, the virtue of justice would be irrelevant [Hume] |
| 21093 | Friendship without community spirit misses out on the main part of virtue [Hume] |
| 3918 | Moral philosophy aims to show us our duty [Hume] |
| 3768 | Orthodox morality is the only one which feels obligatory [Mill] |
| 3919 | Conclusions of reason do not affect our emotions or decisions to act [Hume] |
| 3776 | Utilitarianism only works if everybody has a totally equal right to happiness [Mill] |
| 7214 | Ethics rests on utility, which is the permanent progressive interests of people [Mill] |
| 7202 | The English believe in the task of annihilating evil for the victory of good [Nietzsche on Mill] |
| 5935 | Mill's qualities of pleasure is an admission that there are other good states of mind than pleasure [Ross on Mill] |
| 3764 | Actions are right if they promote pleasure, wrong if they promote pain [Mill] |
| 3928 | Virtue just requires careful calculation and a preference for the greater happiness [Hume] |
| 3763 | Ultimate goods such as pleasure can never be proved to be good [Mill] |
| 3766 | Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied [Mill] |
| 3765 | Only pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends [Mill] |
| 3923 | No one would cause pain to a complete stranger who happened to be passing [Hume] |
| 3924 | Nature makes private affections come first, because public concerns are spread too thinly [Hume] |
| 3770 | General happiness is only desirable because individuals desire their own happiness [Mill] |
| 6697 | Moral rules protecting human welfare are more vital than local maxims [Mill] |
| 7212 | Individuals have sovereignty over their own bodies and minds [Mill] |
| 21099 | People must have agreed to authority, because they are naturally equal, prior to education [Hume] |
| 3774 | Rights are a matter of justice, not of benevolence [Mill] |
| 3773 | No individual has the right to receive our benevolence [Mill] |
| 3921 | The safety of the people is the supreme law [Hume] |
| 21096 | The only purpose of government is to administer justice, which brings security [Hume] |
| 21100 | The idea that society rests on consent or promises undermines obedience [Hume] |
| 20495 | We no more give 'tacit assent' to the state than a passenger carried on board a ship while asleep [Hume] |
| 21101 | The people would be amazed to learn that government arises from their consent [Hume] |
| 7210 | The will of the people is that of the largest or most active part of the people [Mill] |
| 21091 | It would be absurd if even a free constitution did not impose restraints, for the public good [Hume] |
| 21097 | Modern monarchies are (like republics) rule by law, rather than by men [Hume] |
| 7227 | It is evil to give a government any more power than is necessary [Mill] |
| 21092 | Nobility either share in the power of the whole, or they compose the power of the whole [Hume] |
| 3927 | Society prefers helpful lies to harmful truth [Hume] |
| 7228 | Individuals often do things better than governments [Mill] |
| 7230 | Aim for the maximum dissemination of power consistent with efficiency [Mill] |
| 20515 | Maximise happiness by an area of strict privacy, and an area of utilitarian interventions [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
| 7229 | People who transact their own business will also have the initiative to control their government [Mill] |
| 20508 | How people vote should be on public record, so they can be held accountable [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
| 20507 | Voting is a strict duty, like jury service, and must only be aimed at the public good [Mill] |
| 20505 | Direct democracy is inexperience judging experience, and ignorance judging knowledge [Mill] |
| 20504 | People can only participate in decisions in small communities, so representatives are needed [Mill] |
| 7211 | Prevention of harm to others is the only justification for exercising power over people [Mill] |
| 7231 | The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it [Mill] |
| 7217 | The main argument for freedom is that interference with it is usually misguided [Mill] |
| 2233 | No government has ever suffered by being too tolerant of philosophy [Hume] |
| 7213 | Liberty arises at the point where people can freely and equally discuss things [Mill] |
| 20517 | Utilitarianism values liberty, but guides us on which ones we should have or not have [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
| 20516 | Mill defends freedom as increasing happiness, but maybe it is an intrinsic good [Wolff,J on Mill] |
| 7215 | True freedom is pursuing our own good, while not impeding others [Mill] |
| 7218 | Individuals are not accountable for actions which only concern themselves [Mill] |
| 7221 | Blocking entry to an unsafe bridge does not infringe liberty, since no one wants unsafe bridges [Mill] |
| 7223 | Pimping and running a gambling-house are on the border between toleration and restraint [Mill] |
| 7220 | Restraint for its own sake is an evil [Mill] |
| 6703 | Poor people lack the knowledge or wealth to move to a different state [Hume] |
| 3920 | If you equalise possessions, people's talents will make them unequal again [Hume] |
| 21094 | There are two kinds of right - to power, and to property [Hume] |
| 3775 | A right is a valid claim to society's protection [Mill] |
| 6581 | Hume thought (unlike Locke) that property is a merely conventional relationship [Hume, by Fogelin] |
| 21102 | We all know that the history of property is founded on injustices [Hume] |
| 21095 | It is an exaggeration to say that property is the foundation of all government [Hume] |
| 7219 | Society can punish actions which it believes to be prejudicial to others [Mill] |
| 7226 | Benefits performed by individuals, not by government, help also to educate them [Mill] |
| 7224 | We need individual opinions and conduct, and State education is a means to prevent that [Mill] |
| 7225 | It is a crime to create a being who lacks the ordinary chances of a desirable existence [Mill] |
| 4677 | If suicide is wrong because only God disposes of our lives, it must also be wrong to save lives [Hume] |
| 2195 | We can discover some laws of nature, but never its ultimate principles and causes [Hume] |
| 14301 | We have no good concept of solidity or matter, because accounts of them are all circular [Hume] |
| 2245 | A priori it looks as if a cause could have absolutely any effect [Hume] |
| 4772 | If a singular effect is studied, its cause can only be inferred from the types of events involved [Hume] |
| 4579 | The idea of a final cause is very uncertain and unphilosophical [Hume] |
| 8341 | Hume never even suggests that there is no such thing as causation [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
| 8344 | At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events [Hume, by Davidson] |
| 8382 | For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation [Hume, by Crane] |
| 8345 | A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result [Mill] |
| 10391 | Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill] |
| 14547 | The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill] |
| 3662 | Hume says we can only know constant conjunctions, not that that's what causation IS [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
| 16946 | Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume] |
| 15250 | If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume] |
| 4771 | In both of Hume's definitions, causation is extrinsic to the sequence of events [Psillos on Hume] |
| 5194 | Hume's definition of cause as constantly joined thoughts can't cover undiscovered laws [Ayer on Hume] |
| 2221 | A cause is either similar events following one another, or an experience always suggesting a second experience [Hume] |
| 8377 | Causation is just invariability of succession between every natural fact and a preceding fact [Mill] |
| 2234 | It is only when two species of thing are constantly conjoined that we can infer one from the other [Hume] |
| 2193 | No causes can be known a priori, but only from experience of constant conjunctions [Hume] |
| 8422 | Cause is where if the first object had not been, the second had not existed [Hume] |
| 19274 | Hume seems to presuppose necessary connections between mental events [Kripke on Hume] |
| 20705 | That events could be uncaused is absurd; I only say intuition and demonstration don't show this [Hume] |
| 2218 | In observing causes we can never observe any necessary connections or binding qualities [Hume] |
| 15249 | Hume never shows how a strong habit could generate the concept of necessity [Harré/Madden on Hume] |
| 8339 | Hume's regularity theory of causation is epistemological; he believed in some sort of natural necessity [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
| 14545 | A cause is an antecedent which invariably and unconditionally leads to a phenomenon [Mill] |
| 4773 | Mill's regularity theory of causation is based on an effect preceded by a conjunction of causes [Mill, by Psillos] |
| 4775 | In Mill's 'Method of Agreement' cause is the common factor in a range of different cases [Mill, by Psillos] |
| 4776 | In Mill's 'Method of Difference' the cause is what stops the effect when it is removed [Mill, by Psillos] |
| 9417 | What are the fewest propositions from which all natural uniformities could be inferred? [Mill] |
| 6959 | We can't assume God's perfections are like our ideas or like human attributes [Hume] |
| 6957 | The objects of theological reasoning are too big for our minds [Hume] |
| 2244 | It can never be a logical contradiction to assert the non-existence of something thought to exist [Hume] |
| 21255 | No being's non-existence can imply a contradiction, so its existence cannot be proved a priori [Hume] |
| 21254 | A chain of events requires a cause for the whole as well as the parts, yet the chain is just a sum of parts [Hume] |
| 1435 | If something must be necessary so that something exists rather than nothing, why can't the universe be necessary? [Hume] |
| 6962 | The thing which contains order must be God, so see God where you see order [Hume] |
| 6960 | Analogy suggests that God has a very great human mind [Hume] |
| 6965 | The universe may be the result of trial-and-error [Hume] |
| 6967 | Order may come from an irrational source as well as a rational one [Hume] |
| 21282 | Design cannot prove a unified Deity. Many men make a city, so why not many gods for a world? [Hume] |
| 21280 | From a ship you would judge its creator a genius, not a mere humble workman [Hume] |
| 21281 | This excellent world may be the result of a huge sequence of trial-and-error [Hume] |
| 21283 | Humans renew their species sexually. If there are many gods, would they not do the same? [Hume] |
| 6966 | Creation is more like vegetation than human art, so it won't come from reason [Hume] |
| 21284 | This Creator god might be an infant or incompetent or senile [Hume] |
| 21286 | Motion often begins in matter, with no sign of a controlling agent [Hume] |
| 21287 | The universe could settle into superficial order, without a designer [Hume] |
| 21288 | Ideas arise from objects, not vice versa; ideas only influence matter if they are linked [Hume] |
| 21256 | A surprise feature of all products of 9 looks like design, but is actually a necessity [Hume] |
| 21332 | We don't get a love of 'order' from nature - which is thoroughly chaotic [Mill] |
| 6964 | From our limited view, we cannot tell if the universe is faulty [Hume] |
| 2232 | You can't infer the cause to be any greater than its effect [Hume] |
| 21279 | If the divine cause is proportional to its effects, the effects are finite, so the Deity cannot be infinite [Hume] |
| 6958 | How can we pronounce on a whole after a brief look at a very small part? [Hume] |
| 6963 | Why would we infer an infinite creator from a finite creation? [Hume] |
| 7636 | It can't be more rational to believe in natural laws than miracles if the laws are not rational [Ishaq on Hume] |
| 2227 | A miracle violates laws which have been established by continuous unchanging experience, so should be ignored [Hume] |
| 2228 | All experience must be against a supposed miracle, or it wouldn't be called 'a miracle' [Hume] |
| 2229 | To establish a miracle the falseness of the evidence must be a greater miracle than the claimed miraculous event [Hume] |
| 2185 | The idea of an infinite, intelligent, wise and good God arises from augmenting the best qualities of our own minds [Hume] |
| 7216 | The ethics of the Gospel has been supplemented by barbarous Old Testament values [Mill] |
| 21296 | If all of my perceptions were removed by death, nothing more is needed for total annihilation [Hume] |
| 21333 | Evil comes from good just as often as good comes from evil [Mill] |
| 21335 | Belief that an afterlife is required for justice is an admission that this life is very unjust [Mill] |
| 21334 | No necessity ties an omnipotent Creator, so he evidently wills human misery [Mill] |
| 21329 | Nature dispenses cruelty with no concern for either mercy or justice [Mill] |
| 21328 | Killing is a human crime, but nature kills everyone, and often with great tortures [Mill] |
| 21330 | Nature makes childbirth a miserable experience, often leading to the death of the mother [Mill] |
| 21331 | Hurricanes, locusts, floods and blight can starve a million people to death [Mill] |