78 ideas
22289 | Dedekind proved definition by recursion, and thus proved the basic laws of arithmetic [Dedekind, by Potter] |
10183 | An infinite set maps into its own proper subset [Dedekind, by Reck/Price] |
22288 | We have the idea of self, and an idea of that idea, and so on, so infinite ideas are available [Dedekind, by Potter] |
10706 | Dedekind originally thought more in terms of mereology than of sets [Dedekind, by Potter] |
9823 | Numbers are free creations of the human mind, to understand differences [Dedekind] |
10090 | Dedekind defined the integers, rationals and reals in terms of just the natural numbers [Dedekind, by George/Velleman] |
17452 | Ordinals can define cardinals, as the smallest ordinal that maps the set [Dedekind, by Heck] |
7524 | Order, not quantity, is central to defining numbers [Dedekind, by Monk] |
14131 | Dedekind's ordinals are just members of any progression whatever [Dedekind, by Russell] |
17611 | We want the essence of continuity, by showing its origin in arithmetic [Dedekind] |
10572 | A cut between rational numbers creates and defines an irrational number [Dedekind] |
14437 | Dedekind's axiom that his Cut must be filled has the advantages of theft over honest toil [Dedekind, by Russell] |
18094 | Dedekind says each cut matches a real; logicists say the cuts are the reals [Dedekind, by Bostock] |
18244 | I say the irrational is not the cut itself, but a new creation which corresponds to the cut [Dedekind] |
9824 | In counting we see the human ability to relate, correspond and represent [Dedekind] |
17612 | Arithmetic is just the consequence of counting, which is the successor operation [Dedekind] |
9826 | A system S is said to be infinite when it is similar to a proper part of itself [Dedekind] |
18087 | If x changes by less and less, it must approach a limit [Dedekind] |
13508 | Dedekind gives a base number which isn't a successor, then adds successors and induction [Dedekind, by Hart,WD] |
18096 | Zero is a member, and all successors; numbers are the intersection of sets satisfying this [Dedekind, by Bostock] |
18841 | Categoricity implies that Dedekind has characterised the numbers, because it has one domain [Rumfitt on Dedekind] |
14130 | Induction is proved in Dedekind, an axiom in Peano; the latter seems simpler and clearer [Dedekind, by Russell] |
8924 | Dedekind originated the structuralist conception of mathematics [Dedekind, by MacBride] |
9153 | Dedekindian abstraction talks of 'positions', where Cantorian abstraction talks of similar objects [Dedekind, by Fine,K] |
9825 | A thing is completely determined by all that can be thought concerning it [Dedekind] |
6346 | The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz] |
6351 | Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz] |
6374 | To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz] |
6355 | Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
6359 | Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz] |
6366 | Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz] |
6362 | Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz] |
6371 | Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz] |
6373 | Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz] |
6353 | People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz] |
6361 | Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz] |
6357 | Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
6363 | Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz] |
6365 | Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz] |
6354 | Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz] |
6367 | Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz] |
6370 | Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz] |
6358 | One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz] |
6364 | We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz] |
6352 | Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz] |
6372 | Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz] |
6360 | Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz] |
9189 | Dedekind said numbers were abstracted from systems of objects, leaving only their position [Dedekind, by Dummett] |
9827 | We derive the natural numbers, by neglecting everything of a system except distinctness and order [Dedekind] |
9979 | Dedekind has a conception of abstraction which is not psychologistic [Dedekind, by Tait] |
23590 | Criminal responsibility can be fully assigned to each member of a group [Walzer] |
23578 | Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer] |
23564 | Deep ethical theory is very controversial, but we have to live with higher ethical practice [Walzer] |
20595 | You can't distribute goods from behind a veil, because their social meaning is unclear [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
20592 | Complex equality restricts equalities from spilling over, like money influencing politics and law [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
20549 | Equality is complex, with different spheres of equality where different principles apply [Walzer, by Swift] |
23568 | If whole states possess rights, there can be social relations between states [Walzer] |
23571 | States can rightly pre-empt real and serious threats [Walzer] |
23572 | Just wars are self-defence, or a rightful intercession in another's troubles [Walzer] |
23581 | The aim of reprisals is to enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |
23582 | Reprisal is defensible, as an alternative to war [Walzer] |
23588 | With nuclear weapons we have a permanent supreme emergency (which is unstable) [Walzer] |
23580 | States need not endure attacks passively, and successful reprisals are legitimate [Walzer] |
23567 | Even non-violent intrusive acts between states count as aggression, if they justify resistance [Walzer] |
23570 | The only good reason for fighting is in defence of rights [Walzer] |
23587 | Nuclear bombs are not for normal war; they undermine the 'just war', with a new morality [Walzer] |
23573 | For moral reasons, a just war must be a limited war [Walzer] |
23577 | Napoleon said 'I don't care about the deaths of a million men' [Walzer] |
23593 | Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello are independent; unjust wars can be fought in a just way [Walzer] |
23574 | The duties and moral status of loyal and obedient soldiers is the same in defence and aggression [Walzer] |
23575 | We can't blame soldiers for anything they do which clearly promotes victory [Walzer] |
23584 | Rejecting Combatant Equality allows just soldiers to be harsher, even to the extreme [Walzer] |
23614 | Even aggressor soldiers are not criminals, so they have equal rights with their opponents [Walzer] |
23589 | Kidnapped sailors and volunteers have different obligations to the passengers [Walzer] |
23579 | Soldiers will only protect civilians if they feel safe from them [Walzer] |
23586 | What matters in war is unacceptable targets, not unacceptable weapons [Walzer] |
23591 | If the oppressor is cruel, nonviolence is either surrender, or a mere gesture [Walzer] |
23592 | We can only lead war towards peace if we firmly enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |