Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for J. Alberto Coffa, Sally Haslanger and John Duns Scotus

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37 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
18270 Choice suggests that intensions are not needed to ensure classes [Coffa]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
13931 By using aporiai as his start, Aristotle can defer to the wise, as well as to the many [Haslanger]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
22121 The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
22122 Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
16660 Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Duns Scotus, by Pasnau]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
13925 Ontology disputes rest on more basic explanation disputes [Haslanger]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
16648 Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
22125 Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
15386 If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
15387 If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
16632 We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
22127 Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
13094 The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
16650 'Unity' is a particularly difficult word, because things can have hidden unity [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
16770 It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
16776 Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus]
16626 Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being' [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
16614 Matter and form give true unity; subject and accident is just unity 'per accidens' [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10919 What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
22126 Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
13924 The persistence of objects seems to be needed if the past is to explain the present [Haslanger]
13930 Persistence makes change and its products intelligible [Haslanger]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
13927 We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable [Haslanger]
13928 If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed [Haslanger]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
16768 Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
22129 Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
22130 Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
22128 Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing but scepticism [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
18263 The semantic tradition aimed to explain the a priori semantically, not by Kantian intuition [Coffa]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
18272 Platonism defines the a priori in a way that makes it unknowable [Coffa]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
13929 Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
13926 Best explanations, especially natural ones, need grounding, notably by persistent objects [Haslanger]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
18266 Mathematics generalises by using variables [Coffa]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
22131 The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
18279 Relativity is as absolutist about space-time as Newton was about space [Coffa]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
22123 The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
22124 We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]