Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for J.B. Watson, Alvin Plantinga and Eric R. Scerri

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73 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga]
'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
A snowball's haecceity is the property of being identical with itself [Plantinga, by Westerhoff]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga]
Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga]
'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga]
Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga]
'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong]
Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga]
If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world [Plantinga, by Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Maybe a reliable justification must come from a process working with its 'proper function' [Plantinga, by Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
If a theory can be fudged, so can observations [Scerri]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
The periodic system is the big counterexample to Kuhn's theory of revolutionary science [Scerri]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Scientists eventually seek underlying explanations for every pattern [Scerri]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
The periodic table suggests accommodation to facts rates above prediction [Scerri]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction [Plantinga]
Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts [Plantinga]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
I could take a healthy infant and train it up to be any type of specialist I choose [Watson,JB]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Natural kinds are what are differentiated by nature, and not just by us [Scerri]
If elements are natural kinds, might the groups of the periodic table also be natural kinds? [Scerri]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
The colour of gold is best explained by relativistic effects due to fast-moving inner-shell electrons [Scerri]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
The stability of nuclei can be estimated through their binding energy [Scerri]
If all elements are multiples of one (of hydrogen), that suggests once again that matter is unified [Scerri]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
The electron is the main source of chemical properties [Scerri]
A big chemistry idea is that covalent bonds are shared electrons, not transfer of electrons [Scerri]
How can poisonous elements survive in the nutritious compound they compose? [Scerri]
Periodicity and bonding are the two big ideas in chemistry [Scerri]
Chemistry does not work from general principles, but by careful induction from large amounts of data [Scerri]
Does radioactivity show that only physics can explain chemistry? [Scerri]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
It is now thought that all the elements have literally evolved from hydrogen [Scerri]
19th C views said elements survived abstractly in compounds, but also as 'material ingredients' [Scerri]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Moseley, using X-rays, showed that atomic number ordered better than atomic weight [Scerri]
Some suggested basing the new periodic table on isotopes, not elements [Scerri]
Elements are placed in the table by the number of positive charges - the atomic number [Scerri]
Elements in the table are grouped by having the same number of outer-shell electrons [Scerri]
Orthodoxy says the periodic table is explained by quantum mechanics [Scerri]
Pauli explained the electron shells, but not the lengths of the periods in the table [Scerri]
Moseley showed the elements progress in units, and thereby clearly identified the gaps [Scerri]
Elements were ordered by equivalent weight; later by atomic weight; finally by atomic number [Scerri]
The best classification needs the deepest and most general principles of the atoms [Scerri]
Since 99.96% of the universe is hydrogen and helium, the periodic table hardly matters [Scerri]
To explain the table, quantum mechanics still needs to explain order of shell filling [Scerri]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
A possible world contains a being of maximal greatness - which is existence in all worlds [Plantinga, by Davies,B]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
Moral evil may be acceptable to God because it allows free will (even though we don't see why this is necessary) [Plantinga, by PG]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
It is logically possible that natural evil like earthquakes is caused by Satan [Plantinga, by PG]