Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for J.B. Watson, Francesco Orsi and Richard Wollheim

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31 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
20339 Classes rarely share properties with their members - unlike universals and types [Wollheim]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
20338 We often treat a type as if it were a sort of token [Wollheim]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
20342 Interpretation is performance for some arts, and critical for all arts [Wollheim]
20343 A love of nature must precede a love of art [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
20348 A criterion of identity for works of art would be easier than a definition [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 2. Art as Form
20347 If beauty needs organisation, then totally simple things can't be beautiful [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
20345 Some say art must have verbalisable expression, and others say the opposite! [Wollheim]
20331 It is claimed that the expressive properties of artworks are non-physical [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 6. Art as Institution
20336 Style can't be seen directly within a work, but appreciation needs a grasp of style [Wollheim]
20337 The traditional view is that knowledge of its genre to essential to appreciating literature [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art
20333 If artworks are not physical objects, they are either ideal entities, or collections of phenomena [Wollheim]
20334 The ideal theory says art is an intuition, shaped by a particular process, and presented in public [Wollheim]
20335 The ideal theory of art neglects both the audience and the medium employed [Wollheim]
20340 A musical performance has virtually the same features as the piece of music [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
20341 An interpretation adds further properties to the generic piece of music [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
20332 A drawing only represents Napoleon if the artist intended it to [Wollheim]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
7517 I could take a healthy infant and train it up to be any type of specialist I choose [Watson,JB]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]