Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for J.B. Watson, Keith Lehrer and John Mayberry

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37 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
2945 Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
2946 You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
17774 Definitions make our intuitions mathematically useful [Mayberry]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
17773 Proof shows that it is true, but also why it must be true [Mayberry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
17796 There is a semi-categorical axiomatisation of set-theory [Mayberry]
17795 Set theory can't be axiomatic, because it is needed to express the very notion of axiomatisation [Mayberry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
17800 The misnamed Axiom of Infinity says the natural numbers are finite in size [Mayberry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
17801 The set hierarchy doesn't rely on the dubious notion of 'generating' them [Mayberry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
17803 Limitation of size is part of the very conception of a set [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
17786 The mainstream of modern logic sees it as a branch of mathematics [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
17788 First-order logic only has its main theorems because it is so weak [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
17791 Only second-order logic can capture mathematical structure up to isomorphism [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
17787 Big logic has one fixed domain, but standard logic has a domain for each interpretation [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
17790 No Löwenheim-Skolem logic can axiomatise real analysis [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
17779 'Classificatory' axioms aim at revealing similarity in morphology of structures [Mayberry]
17778 Axiomatiation relies on isomorphic structures being essentially the same [Mayberry]
17780 'Eliminatory' axioms get rid of traditional ideal and abstract objects [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
17789 No logic which can axiomatise arithmetic can be compact or complete [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
17784 Real numbers can be eliminated, by axiom systems for complete ordered fields [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / b. Quantity
17782 Greek quantities were concrete, and ratio and proportion were their science [Mayberry]
17781 Real numbers were invented, as objects, to simplify and generalise 'quantity' [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
17799 Cantor's infinite is an absolute, of all the sets or all the ordinal numbers [Mayberry]
17797 Cantor extended the finite (rather than 'taming the infinite') [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
17775 If proof and definition are central, then mathematics needs and possesses foundations [Mayberry]
17776 The ultimate principles and concepts of mathematics are presumed, or grasped directly [Mayberry]
17777 Foundations need concepts, definition rules, premises, and proof rules [Mayberry]
17804 Axiom theories can't give foundations for mathematics - that's using axioms to explain axioms [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
17792 1st-order PA is only interesting because of results which use 2nd-order PA [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
17793 It is only 2nd-order isomorphism which suggested first-order PA completeness [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
17794 Set theory is not just first-order ZF, because that is inadequate for mathematics [Mayberry]
17802 We don't translate mathematics into set theory, because it comes embodied in that way [Mayberry]
17805 Set theory is not just another axiomatised part of mathematics [Mayberry]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
17785 Real numbers as abstracted objects are now treated as complete ordered fields [Mayberry]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
9329 Justification is coherence with a background system; if irrefutable, it is knowledge [Lehrer]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
9330 Generalization seems to be more fundamental to minds than spotting similarities [Lehrer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
9328 All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them [Lehrer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
7517 I could take a healthy infant and train it up to be any type of specialist I choose [Watson,JB]