Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for J.B. Watson, Steven Pinker and Ross P. Cameron

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42 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron]
If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron]
Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]
Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron]
God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron]
One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]
We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron]
I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Good reductionism connects fields of knowledge, but doesn't replace one with another [Pinker]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron]
Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron]
Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron]
An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Connectionists say the mind is a general purpose learning device [Pinker]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Is memory stored in protein sequences, neurons, synapses, or synapse-strengths? [Pinker]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Roundworms live successfully with 302 neurons, so human freedom comes from our trillions [Pinker]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Neural networks can generalise their training, e.g. truths about tigers apply mostly to lions [Pinker]
There are five types of reasoning that seem beyond connectionist systems [Pinker, by PG]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Many think that accepting human nature is to accept innumerable evils [Pinker]
I could take a healthy infant and train it up to be any type of specialist I choose [Watson,JB]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
In 1828, the stuff of life was shown to be ordinary chemistry, not a magic gel [Pinker]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
All the evidence says evolution is cruel and wasteful, not intelligent [Pinker]
Intelligent Design says that every unexplained phenomenon must be design, by default [Pinker]