20 ideas
| 18859 | Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant] |
| 8368 | A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse] |
| 18861 | Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant] |
| 18866 | Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant] |
| 18860 | A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant] |
| 18863 | What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant] |
| 18864 | The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant] |
| 15797 | All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer] |
| 18865 | Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant] |
| 15800 | All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer] |
| 18862 | Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant] |
| 15798 | Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer] |
| 8367 | Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse] |
| 8372 | We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse] |
| 8369 | Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse] |
| 8373 | When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse] |
| 8370 | A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse] |
| 8371 | Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse] |
| 8374 | We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse] |
| 15799 | Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer] |