22 ideas
| 8921 | Structuralism is now common, studying relations, with no regard for what the objects might be [Hellman] |
| 8698 | Modal structuralism says mathematics studies possible structures, which may or may not be actualised [Hellman, by Friend] |
| 9557 | Statements of pure mathematics are elliptical for a sort of modal conditional [Hellman, by Chihara] |
| 10263 | Modal structuralism can only judge possibility by 'possible' models [Shapiro on Hellman] |
| 8922 | Maybe mathematical objects only have structural roles, and no intrinsic nature [Hellman] |
| 22179 | Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha] |
| 21507 | Scientific explanation aims at a unifying account of underlying structures and processes [Hempel] |
| 6755 | For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird] |
| 17083 | The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel] |
| 13052 | Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon] |
| 4761 | The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Mackie, by Engel] |
| 8337 | Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie] |
| 8342 | Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie] |
| 8343 | Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie] |
| 8385 | A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane] |
| 8335 | Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie] |
| 8336 | The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie] |
| 8333 | A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie] |
| 8395 | Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley] |
| 8334 | The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie] |
| 1472 | The propositions that God is good and omnipotent, and that evil exists, are logically contradictory [Mackie, by PG] |
| 1473 | Is evil an illusion, or a necessary contrast, or uncontrollable, or necessary for human free will? [Mackie, by PG] |