Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for J.L. Mackie, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and W Wimsatt/W Beardsley

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophers are marked by a joint love of evidence and ambiguity [Merleau-Ponty]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Consciousness is based on 'I can', not on 'I think' [Merleau-Ponty]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
The mind does not unite perceptions, because they flow into one another [Merleau-Ponty]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
Intentions either succeed or fail, so external evidence for them is always irrelevant [Wimsatt/Beardsley, by Davies,S]
The author's intentions are irrelevant to the judgement of a work's success [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
Poetry, unlike messages, can be successful without communicating intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
The thoughts of a poem should be imputed to the dramatic speaker, and hardly at all to the poet [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
The intentional fallacy is a romantic one [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
Biography can reveal meanings and dramatic character, as well as possible intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Mackie, by Engel]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie]
A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane]
Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie]
The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley]
The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
The propositions that God is good and omnipotent, and that evil exists, are logically contradictory [Mackie, by PG]
Is evil an illusion, or a necessary contrast, or uncontrollable, or necessary for human free will? [Mackie, by PG]