Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for J.P. Moreland, Robert Fogelin and Johann Winckelmann

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47 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy may never find foundations, and may undermine our lives in the process [Fogelin]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Rationality is threatened by fear of inconsistency, illusions of absolutes or relativism, and doubt [Fogelin]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Humans may never be able to attain a world view which is both rich and consistent [Fogelin]
A game can be played, despite having inconsistent rules [Fogelin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
The law of noncontradiction is traditionally the most basic principle of rationality [Fogelin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
The law of noncontradiction makes the distinction between asserting something and denying it [Fogelin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple [Moreland]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Legal reasoning is analogical, not deductive [Fogelin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland]
In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland]
One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland]
Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland]
The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland]
Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland]
A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland]
There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false [Moreland]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
My view is 'circumspect rationalism' - that only our intellect can comprehend the world [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing [Moreland]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
We are also irrational, with a unique ability to believe in bizarre self-created fictions [Fogelin]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Critics must be causally entangled with their subject matter [Fogelin]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The word 'beautiful', when deprived of context, is nearly contentless [Fogelin]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Art aims only at beauty, of form, of idea, and (above all) of expression [Winckelmann, by Tolstoy]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Saying 'It's all a matter to taste' ignores the properties of the object discussed [Fogelin]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Cynics are committed to morality, but disappointed or disgusted by human failings [Fogelin]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution can come into conflict in punishments [Fogelin]
Retributivists say a crime can be 'paid for'; deterrentists still worry about potential victims [Fogelin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists [Moreland]