Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for J.P. Moreland, St Paul and John von Neumann

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


40 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy [Paul]
Don't be tossed to and fro with every wind of doctrine, by cunning deceptive men [Paul]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple [Moreland]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Von Neumann defines each number as the set of all smaller numbers [Neumann, by Blackburn]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Limitation of Size is not self-evident, and seems too strong [Lavine on Neumann]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Von Neumann wanted mathematical functions to replace sets [Neumann, by Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Von Neumann treated cardinals as a special sort of ordinal [Neumann, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Von Neumann defined ordinals as the set of all smaller ordinals [Neumann, by Poundstone]
A von Neumann ordinal is a transitive set with transitive elements [Neumann, by Badiou]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / g. Von Neumann numbers
For Von Neumann the successor of n is n U {n} (rather than {n}) [Neumann, by Maddy]
Von Neumann numbers are preferred, because they continue into the transfinite [Maddy on Neumann]
Each Von Neumann ordinal number is the set of its predecessors [Neumann, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
All the axioms for mathematics presuppose set theory [Neumann]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland]
In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland]
One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland]
Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland]
The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland]
Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland]
A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland]
There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false [Moreland]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
When Gentiles follow the law, they must have the law written in their hearts [Paul]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing [Moreland]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 10. Theocracy
Power is ordained by God, so anyone who resists power resists God, and will be damned [Paul]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Jew and Greeks, bond and free, male and female, are all one in Christ [Paul]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists [Moreland]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
God's eternal power and deity are clearly seen in what has been created [Paul]