90 ideas
| 21887 | Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida] |
| 7493 | Let us reason together, saith the Lord [Isaiah] |
| 21888 | Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida] |
| 21896 | Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May] |
| 21893 | Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida] |
| 21892 | Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida] |
| 20925 | Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
| 20934 | Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
| 21895 | Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida] |
| 8210 | Deconstructing philosophy gives the history of concepts, and the repressions behind them [Derrida] |
| 8211 | The movement of 'différance' is the root of all the oppositional concepts in our language [Derrida] |
| 6840 | Derrida came to believe in the undeconstructability of justice, which cannot be relativised [Derrida, by Critchley] |
| 21934 | The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21883 | Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida] |
| 21882 | Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida] |
| 8216 | Deconstruction is not neutral; it intervenes [Derrida] |
| 21881 | We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida] |
| 8213 | I try to analyse certain verbal concepts which block and confuse the dialectical process [Derrida] |
| 4756 | Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel] |
| 21877 | True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida] |
| 10987 | Three traditional names of rules are 'Simplification', 'Addition' and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' [Read] |
| 11004 | Necessity is provability in S4, and true in all worlds in S5 [Read] |
| 11018 | There are fuzzy predicates (and sets), and fuzzy quantifiers and modifiers [Read] |
| 11011 | Same say there are positive, negative and neuter free logics [Read] |
| 11020 | Realisms like the full Comprehension Principle, that all good concepts determine sets [Read] |
| 14187 | If logic is topic-neutral that means it delves into all subjects, rather than having a pure subject matter [Read] |
| 10986 | Not all validity is captured in first-order logic [Read] |
| 10972 | The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic [Read] |
| 11024 | Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete [Read] |
| 10985 | We should exclude second-order logic, precisely because it captures arithmetic [Read] |
| 14188 | Not all arguments are valid because of form; validity is just true premises and false conclusion being impossible [Read] |
| 14182 | If the logic of 'taller of' rests just on meaning, then logic may be the study of merely formal consequence [Read] |
| 14183 | Maybe arguments are only valid when suppressed premises are all stated - but why? [Read] |
| 10970 | A theory of logical consequence is a conceptual analysis, and a set of validity techniques [Read] |
| 10984 | Logical consequence isn't just a matter of form; it depends on connections like round-square [Read] |
| 14184 | In modus ponens the 'if-then' premise contributes nothing if the conclusion follows anyway [Read] |
| 14186 | Logical connectives contain no information, but just record combination relations between facts [Read] |
| 10973 | A theory is logically closed, which means infinite premisses [Read] |
| 21878 | Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida] |
| 21889 | 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida] |
| 21879 | Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida] |
| 11007 | Quantifiers are second-order predicates [Read] |
| 10978 | In second-order logic the higher-order variables range over all the properties of the objects [Read] |
| 10971 | A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses [Read] |
| 10988 | Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate [Read] |
| 10974 | Compactness is when any consequence of infinite propositions is the consequence of a finite subset [Read] |
| 10975 | Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses [Read] |
| 10977 | Compactness blocks the proof of 'for every n, A(n)' (as the proof would be infinite) [Read] |
| 10976 | Compactness makes consequence manageable, but restricts expressive power [Read] |
| 11014 | Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read] |
| 11025 | Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us [Read] |
| 10979 | Although second-order arithmetic is incomplete, it can fully model normal arithmetic [Read] |
| 10980 | Second-order arithmetic covers all properties, ensuring categoricity [Read] |
| 10997 | Von Neumann numbers are helpful, but don't correctly describe numbers [Read] |
| 11016 | Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read] |
| 11019 | Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place [Read] |
| 11012 | A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments [Read] |
| 11013 | Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations [Read] |
| 10995 | A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing [Read] |
| 11001 | Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read] |
| 10992 | The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read] |
| 10989 | The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read] |
| 11017 | Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read] |
| 14185 | Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details [Read] |
| 10983 | Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read] |
| 10982 | How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read] |
| 10996 | Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read] |
| 10981 | A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read] |
| 11000 | If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read] |
| 21890 | Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida] |
| 10998 | The mind abstracts ways things might be, which are nonetheless real [Read] |
| 21880 | 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida] |
| 21932 | 'Différance' is the interwoven history of each sign [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21886 | Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida] |
| 21930 | For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida] |
| 21884 | Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida] |
| 21935 | The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida] |
| 21933 | Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21894 | Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida] |
| 8212 | Everything that is experienced in consciousness is meaning [Derrida] |
| 21929 | Derrida focuses on ambiguity, but talks of 'dissemination', not traditional multiple meanings [Derrida] |
| 21931 | 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21885 | Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida] |
| 11005 | Negative existentials with compositionality make the whole sentence meaningless [Read] |
| 10966 | A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read] |
| 21891 | The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida] |
| 21936 | A community must consist of singular persons, with nothing in common [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21937 | Can there be democratic friendship without us all becoming identical? [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 7608 | The world is established, and cannot be moved [Isaiah] |
| 7343 | Beside me there is no God [Isaiah] |