84 ideas
21887 | Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida] |
21888 | Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida] |
21896 | Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May] |
21893 | Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida] |
21892 | Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida] |
20925 | Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
20934 | Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
21895 | Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida] |
8210 | Deconstructing philosophy gives the history of concepts, and the repressions behind them [Derrida] |
8211 | The movement of 'différance' is the root of all the oppositional concepts in our language [Derrida] |
6840 | Derrida came to believe in the undeconstructability of justice, which cannot be relativised [Derrida, by Critchley] |
21934 | The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21883 | Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida] |
21882 | Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida] |
8216 | Deconstruction is not neutral; it intervenes [Derrida] |
21881 | We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida] |
17892 | For clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers [Gödel] |
8213 | I try to analyse certain verbal concepts which block and confuse the dialectical process [Derrida] |
10041 | Impredicative Definitions refer to the totality to which the object itself belongs [Gödel] |
4756 | Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel] |
21877 | True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida] |
21752 | Prior to Gödel we thought truth in mathematics consisted in provability [Gödel, by Quine] |
17751 | Gödel proved the completeness of first order predicate logic in 1930 [Gödel, by Walicki] |
8679 | We perceive the objects of set theory, just as we perceive with our senses [Gödel] |
17835 | Gödel show that the incompleteness of set theory was a necessity [Gödel, by Hallett,M] |
9942 | Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L [Gödel, by Putnam] |
21716 | In simple type theory the axiom of Separation is better than Reducibility [Gödel, by Linsky,B] |
9188 | Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete [Gödel, by Dummett] |
10035 | Mathematical Logic is a non-numerical branch of mathematics, and the supreme science [Gödel] |
21889 | 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida] |
21878 | Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida] |
21879 | Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida] |
10042 | Reference to a totality need not refer to a conjunction of all its elements [Gödel] |
10620 | Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel] |
17886 | The limitations of axiomatisation were revealed by the incompleteness theorems [Gödel, by Koellner] |
10071 | Second Incompleteness: nice theories can't prove their own consistency [Gödel, by Smith,P] |
19123 | If soundness can't be proved internally, 'reflection principles' can be added to assert soundness [Gödel, by Halbach/Leigh] |
17883 | Gödel's Theorems did not refute the claim that all good mathematical questions have answers [Gödel, by Koellner] |
10621 | Gödel's First Theorem sabotages logicism, and the Second sabotages Hilbert's Programme [Smith,P on Gödel] |
17888 | The undecidable sentence can be decided at a 'higher' level in the system [Gödel] |
10038 | A logical system needs a syntactical survey of all possible expressions [Gödel] |
18062 | Set-theory paradoxes are no worse than sense deception in physics [Gödel] |
10132 | There can be no single consistent theory from which all mathematical truths can be derived [Gödel, by George/Velleman] |
10046 | The generalized Continuum Hypothesis asserts a discontinuity in cardinal numbers [Gödel] |
10868 | The Continuum Hypothesis is not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory [Gödel, by Clegg] |
13517 | If set theory is consistent, we cannot refute or prove the Continuum Hypothesis [Gödel, by Hart,WD] |
17885 | Gödel eventually hoped for a generalised completeness theorem leaving nothing undecidable [Gödel, by Koellner] |
10614 | The real reason for Incompleteness in arithmetic is inability to define truth in a language [Gödel] |
3198 | Gödel showed that arithmetic is either incomplete or inconsistent [Gödel, by Rey] |
10072 | First Incompleteness: arithmetic must always be incomplete [Gödel, by Smith,P] |
9590 | Arithmetical truth cannot be fully and formally derived from axioms and inference rules [Gödel, by Nagel/Newman] |
11069 | Gödel's Second says that semantic consequence outruns provability [Gödel, by Hanna] |
10118 | First Incompleteness: a decent consistent system is syntactically incomplete [Gödel, by George/Velleman] |
10122 | Second Incompleteness: a decent consistent system can't prove its own consistency [Gödel, by George/Velleman] |
10611 | There is a sentence which a theory can show is true iff it is unprovable [Gödel, by Smith,P] |
10867 | 'This system can't prove this statement' makes it unprovable either way [Gödel, by Clegg] |
10039 | Some arithmetical problems require assumptions which transcend arithmetic [Gödel] |
10043 | Mathematical objects are as essential as physical objects are for perception [Gödel] |
10271 | Basic mathematics is related to abstract elements of our empirical ideas [Gödel] |
10045 | Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics [Gödel] |
8747 | Realists are happy with impredicative definitions, which describe entities in terms of other existing entities [Gödel, by Shapiro] |
21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |
21890 | Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida] |
3192 | Basic logic can be done by syntax, with no semantics [Gödel, by Rey] |
21880 | 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida] |
21932 | 'Différance' is the interwoven history of each sign [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21886 | Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida] |
21930 | For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida] |
21884 | Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida] |
21935 | The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida] |
21933 | Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21894 | Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida] |
8212 | Everything that is experienced in consciousness is meaning [Derrida] |
21929 | Derrida focuses on ambiguity, but talks of 'dissemination', not traditional multiple meanings [Derrida] |
21931 | 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21885 | Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida] |
21891 | The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida] |
21936 | A community must consist of singular persons, with nothing in common [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21937 | Can there be democratic friendship without us all becoming identical? [Derrida, by Glendinning] |