Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jacques Lenfant, Christine M. Korsgaard and Michael Tooley

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23 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
12750 The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
9758 To make sense of personal identity, focus on agency rather than experience [Korsgaard]
9757 A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
9759 Theory of action focuses on explanation and prediction; practical action on justification and choice [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
18678 Maybe final value rests on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent [Korsgaard, by Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18225 If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard]
18228 An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
9760 Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
18224 Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
9761 Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
18233 Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard]
18226 For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
8388 Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley]
8389 Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
8416 Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8393 We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
8390 Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
8418 Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic [Tooley]
8392 Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley]
8399 The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8391 In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
8394 Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley]
8398 Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley]