Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jacques Lenfant, Ned Markosian and H. Paul Grice

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

28 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
22140 The greatest philosophers are methodical; it is what makes them great [Grice]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
14001 People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is [Markosian]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
13991 Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him [Markosian]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
12750 The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
13856 Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington]
8948 The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher]
13767 Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
10990 Conditionals are truth-functional, but unassertable in tricky cases? [Grice, by Read]
14277 A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14002 Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
7752 Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice]
7751 Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice]
7753 We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
14000 'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
22330 Grice said patterns of use are often semantically irrelevant, because it is a pragmatic matter [Grice, by Glock]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
18045 Grice's maxim of quality says do not assert what you believe to be false [Grice, by Magidor]
18044 Grice's maxim of manner requires one to be as brief as possible [Grice, by Magidor]
10991 Key conversational maxims are 'quality' (assert truth) and 'quantity' (leave nothing out) [Grice, by Read]
18046 Grice's maxim of quantity says be sufficiently informative [Grice, by Magidor]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
13990 Presentism is the view that only present objects exist [Markosian]
13992 Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them [Markosian]
13994 Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times [Markosian]
13995 Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this [Markosian]
13996 Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears [Markosian]
13997 Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past [Markosian]
13993 Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs [Markosian]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
13998 Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects [Markosian]
13999 People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something [Markosian]