Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jacques Lenfant, Rom Harr and Ernst Zermelo

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49 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Predicative definitions are acceptable in mathematics if they distinguish objects, rather than creating them? [Zermelo, by Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
The Square of Opposition has two contradictory pairs, one contrary pair, and one sub-contrary pair [Harré]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
We take set theory as given, and retain everything valuable, while avoiding contradictions [Zermelo]
Set theory investigates number, order and function, showing logical foundations for mathematics [Zermelo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
ZFC: Existence, Extension, Specification, Pairing, Unions, Powers, Infinity, Choice [Zermelo, by Clegg]
Zermelo published his axioms in 1908, to secure a controversial proof [Zermelo, by Maddy]
Set theory can be reduced to a few definitions and seven independent axioms [Zermelo]
Zermelo made 'set' and 'member' undefined axioms [Zermelo, by Chihara]
For Zermelo's set theory the empty set is zero and the successor of each number is its unit set [Zermelo, by Blackburn]
Zermelo showed that the ZF axioms in 1930 were non-categorical [Zermelo, by Hallett,M]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Zermelo introduced Pairing in 1930, and it seems fairly obvious [Zermelo, by Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / h. Axiom of Replacement VII
Replacement was added when some advanced theorems seemed to need it [Zermelo, by Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / i. Axiom of Foundation VIII
Zermelo used Foundation to block paradox, but then decided that only Separation was needed [Zermelo, by Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation
The Axiom of Separation requires set generation up to one step back from contradiction [Zermelo, by Maddy]
Not every predicate has an extension, but Separation picks the members that satisfy a predicate [Zermelo, by Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Traditional quantifiers combine ordinary language generality and ontology assumptions [Harré]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Some quantifiers, such as 'any', rule out any notion of order within their range [Harré]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
The antinomy of endless advance and of completion is resolved in well-ordered transfinite numbers [Zermelo]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
In ZF, the Burali-Forti Paradox proves that there is no set of all ordinals [Zermelo, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / e. Countable infinity
Zermelo realised that Choice would facilitate the sort of 'counting' Cantor needed [Zermelo, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / f. Zermelo numbers
For Zermelo the successor of n is {n} (rather than n U {n}) [Zermelo, by Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Zermelo believed, and Von Neumann seemed to confirm, that numbers are sets [Zermelo, by Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Different versions of set theory result in different underlying structures for numbers [Zermelo, by Brown,JR]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Scientific properties are not observed qualities, but the dispositions which create them [Harré]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Laws of nature remain the same through any conditions, if the underlying mechanisms are unchanged [Harré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered [Harré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature [Harré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions [Harré]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré]
The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected [Harré]
Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black' [Harré]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Idealisation idealises all of a thing's properties, but abstraction leaves some of them out [Harré]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
We should judge principles by the science, not science by some fixed principles [Zermelo]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Science rests on the principle that nature is a hierarchy of natural kinds [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Classification is just as important as laws in natural science [Harré]
Newton's First Law cannot be demonstrated experimentally, as that needs absence of external forces [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Laws can come from data, from theory, from imagination and concepts, or from procedures [Harré]
Are laws of nature about events, or types and universals, or dispositions, or all three? [Harré]
Are laws about what has or might happen, or do they also cover all the possibilities? [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
We take it that only necessary happenings could be laws [Harré]
Laws describe abstract idealisations, not the actual mess of nature [Harré]
Must laws of nature be universal, or could they be local? [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Laws of nature state necessary connections of things, events and properties, based on models of mechanisms [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them [Harré]