55 ideas
| 11912 | Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar] |
| 11920 | A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar] |
| 10476 | The idea that groups of concepts could be 'implicitly defined' was abandoned [Hodges,W] |
| 10282 | Logic is the study of sound argument, or of certain artificial languages (or applying the latter to the former) [Hodges,W] |
| 10478 | Since first-order languages are complete, |= and |- have the same meaning [Hodges,W] |
| 10477 | |= in model-theory means 'logical consequence' - it holds in all models [Hodges,W] |
| 10283 | A formula needs an 'interpretation' of its constants, and a 'valuation' of its variables [Hodges,W] |
| 10284 | There are three different standard presentations of semantics [Hodges,W] |
| 10285 | I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I [Hodges,W] |
| 10474 | |= should be read as 'is a model for' or 'satisfies' [Hodges,W] |
| 10473 | Model theory studies formal or natural language-interpretation using set-theory [Hodges,W] |
| 10475 | A 'structure' is an interpretation specifying objects and classes of quantification [Hodges,W] |
| 10481 | Models in model theory are structures, not sets of descriptions [Hodges,W] |
| 10288 | Down Löwenheim-Skolem: if a countable language has a consistent theory, that has a countable model [Hodges,W] |
| 10289 | Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if infinite models, then arbitrarily large models [Hodges,W] |
| 10287 | If a first-order theory entails a sentence, there is a finite subset of the theory which entails it [Hodges,W] |
| 10480 | First-order logic can't discriminate between one infinite cardinal and another [Hodges,W] |
| 10286 | A 'set' is a mathematically well-behaved class [Hodges,W] |
| 11919 | Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar] |
| 11929 | The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar] |
| 11927 | Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar] |
| 11915 | If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar] |
| 11916 | 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar] |
| 11956 | 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar] |
| 11928 | Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar] |
| 11933 | A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar] |
| 11932 | Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar] |
| 11934 | The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar] |
| 11947 | Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar] |
| 11952 | The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar] |
| 11953 | Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar] |
| 12750 | The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant] |
| 11943 | Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar] |
| 11939 | If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar] |
| 11914 | Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar] |
| 11913 | For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar] |
| 11962 | Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar] |
| 11917 | Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar] |
| 11955 | There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar] |
| 11918 | The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar] |
| 11963 | What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar] |
| 11951 | Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar] |
| 11936 | The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar] |
| 11935 | Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar] |
| 11944 | Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar] |
| 11960 | Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar] |
| 11937 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar] |
| 11954 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar] |
| 11961 | Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar] |
| 11959 | Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar] |
| 9448 | Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford] |
| 11930 | One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar] |
| 11957 | It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar] |
| 11921 | The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar] |
| 11931 | Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar] |