184 ideas
| 2319 | Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim] |
| 3426 | If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim] |
| 10859 | A set is 'well-ordered' if every subset has a first element [Clegg] |
| 10857 | Set theory made a closer study of infinity possible [Clegg] |
| 10864 | Any set can always generate a larger set - its powerset, of subsets [Clegg] |
| 10872 | Extensionality: Two sets are equal if and only if they have the same elements [Clegg] |
| 10875 | Pairing: For any two sets there exists a set to which they both belong [Clegg] |
| 10876 | Unions: There is a set of all the elements which belong to at least one set in a collection [Clegg] |
| 10878 | Infinity: There exists a set of the empty set and the successor of each element [Clegg] |
| 10877 | Powers: All the subsets of a given set form their own new powerset [Clegg] |
| 10879 | Choice: For every set a mechanism will choose one member of any non-empty subset [Clegg] |
| 10871 | Axiom of Existence: there exists at least one set [Clegg] |
| 10874 | Specification: a condition applied to a set will always produce a new set [Clegg] |
| 10880 | Mathematics can be 'pure' (unapplied), 'real' (physically grounded); or 'applied' (just applicable) [Clegg] |
| 10861 | Beyond infinity cardinals and ordinals can come apart [Clegg] |
| 10860 | An ordinal number is defined by the set that comes before it [Clegg] |
| 10854 | Transcendental numbers can't be fitted to finite equations [Clegg] |
| 10858 | By adding an axis of imaginary numbers, we get the useful 'number plane' instead of number line [Clegg] |
| 10853 | Either lack of zero made early mathematics geometrical, or the geometrical approach made zero meaningless [Clegg] |
| 10866 | Cantor's account of infinities has the shaky foundation of irrational numbers [Clegg] |
| 10869 | The Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of set theory [Clegg] |
| 10862 | The 'continuum hypothesis' says aleph-one is the cardinality of the reals [Clegg] |
| 4779 | For Kim, events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times [Kim, by Psillos] |
| 10369 | How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated [Kim, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8976 | If events are ordered triples of items, such things seem to be sets, and hence abstract [Simons on Kim] |
| 8975 | Events cannot be merely ordered triples, but must specify the link between the elements [Kim, by Simons] |
| 8974 | Events are composed of an object with an attribute at a time [Kim, by Simons] |
| 8977 | Since properties like self-identity and being 2+2=4 are timeless, Kim must restrict his properties [Simons on Kim] |
| 8980 | Kim's theory results in too many events [Simons on Kim] |
| 2317 | Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG] |
| 3536 | Supervenient properties must have matching base properties [Kim] |
| 2310 | Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim] |
| 2315 | Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim] |
| 13745 | Supervenience is not a dependence relation, on the lines of causal, mereological or semantic dependence [Kim] |
| 13746 | Supervenience is just a 'surface' relation of pattern covariation, which still needs deeper explanation [Kim] |
| 3431 | Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim] |
| 2329 | Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim] |
| 3437 | 'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim] |
| 15456 | Extrinsic properties, unlike intrinsics, imply the existence of a separate object [Kim, by Lewis] |
| 3430 | Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim] |
| 3432 | Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim] |
| 2320 | Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim] |
| 3434 | Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim] |
| 3436 | Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim] |
| 3406 | Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG] |
| 8825 | It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data [Kim] |
| 530 | There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim] |
| 13314 | Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca] |
| 2065 | Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim] |
| 1550 | Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim] |
| 14470 | Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event [Kim] |
| 3368 | Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim] |
| 3392 | Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim] |
| 3396 | Experiment requires mental causation [Kim] |
| 2318 | Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG] |
| 3397 | Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim] |
| 3367 | Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim] |
| 3365 | Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim] |
| 2325 | It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim] |
| 3360 | Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim] |
| 3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
| 3389 | Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim] |
| 3391 | Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG] |
| 3422 | Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim] |
| 3412 | How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim] |
| 3363 | We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim] |
| 3409 | Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim] |
| 3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
| 3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
| 3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
| 3359 | Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim] |
| 3369 | Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim] |
| 3428 | Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim] |
| 3380 | Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim] |
| 3370 | What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim] |
| 3371 | Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim] |
| 3372 | Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim] |
| 3373 | Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim] |
| 3379 | Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim] |
| 2324 | Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim] |
| 3388 | Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim] |
| 3384 | The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim] |
| 3393 | How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim] |
| 3427 | Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim] |
| 2314 | Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim] |
| 3439 | Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim] |
| 3424 | Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim] |
| 3376 | We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim] |
| 2313 | Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim] |
| 2328 | The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim] |
| 2309 | Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim] |
| 3362 | Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim] |
| 3413 | Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim] |
| 2311 | Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim] |
| 3374 | Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim] |
| 3433 | The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim] |
| 3377 | Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim] |
| 3438 | Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim] |
| 3440 | Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim] |
| 2308 | Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim] |
| 2322 | Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim] |
| 2327 | Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim] |
| 3375 | If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim] |
| 3411 | How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim] |
| 2323 | Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim] |
| 3386 | Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim] |
| 3394 | Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim] |
| 3387 | A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim] |
| 3410 | Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim] |
| 3382 | A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim] |
| 3383 | The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim] |
| 3408 | Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim] |
| 3420 | Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim] |
| 3418 | 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim] |
| 3421 | Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim] |
| 3416 | Content may match several things in the environment [Kim] |
| 3419 | Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim] |
| 3417 | Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim] |
| 3403 | We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim] |
| 3402 | If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim] |
| 19956 | True goodness is political, and consists of love of and submission to the laws [Montesquieu] |
| 19961 | Primitive people would be too vulnerable and timid to attack anyone, so peace would reign [Montesquieu] |
| 19962 | Men do not desire to subjugate one another; domination is a complex and advanced idea [Montesquieu] |
| 19963 | People are drawn into society by needs, shared fears, pleasure, and knowledge [Montesquieu] |
| 20008 | People are guided by a multitude of influences, from which the spirit of a nation emerges [Montesquieu] |
| 19993 | In small republics citizens identify with the public good, and abuses are fewer [Montesquieu] |
| 19992 | In a large republic there is too much wealth for individuals to manage it [Montesquieu] |
| 20005 | The rich would never submit to a lottery deciding which part of their society should be slaves [Montesquieu] |
| 19995 | All states aim at preservation, and then have distinctive individual purposes [Montesquieu] |
| 19964 | The natural power of a father suggests rule by one person, but that authority can be spread [Montesquieu] |
| 19986 | Monarchies can act more quickly, because one person is in charge [Montesquieu] |
| 19972 | The nobility are an indispensable part of a monarchy [Montesquieu] |
| 19974 | Monarchs must not just have links to the people; they need a body which maintains the laws [Montesquieu] |
| 19976 | Ambition is good in a monarchy, because the monarch can always restrain it [Montesquieu] |
| 19978 | In monarchies, men's actions are judged by their grand appearance, not their virtues [Montesquieu] |
| 19985 | In a monarchy, the nobility must be hereditary, to bind them together [Montesquieu] |
| 19988 | A despot's agents must be given power, so they inevitably become corrupt [Montesquieu] |
| 19977 | Despotism and honour are incompatible, because honour scorns his power, and lives by rules [Montesquieu] |
| 20007 | Tyranny is either real violence, or the imposition of unpopular legislation [Montesquieu] |
| 19975 | Despots are always lazy and ignorant, so they always delegate their power to a vizier [Montesquieu] |
| 19989 | The will of a despot is an enigma, so magistrates can only follow their own will [Montesquieu] |
| 19970 | If the nobility is numerous, the senate is the artistocracy, and the nobles are a democracy [Montesquieu] |
| 19971 | Aristocracy is democratic if they resemble the people, but not if they resemble the monarch [Montesquieu] |
| 19984 | Great inequality between aristocrats and the rest is bad - and also among aristocrats themselves [Montesquieu] |
| 19980 | If a government is to be preserved, it must first be loved [Montesquieu] |
| 19996 | A government has a legislature, an international executive, and a domestic executive [Montesquieu] |
| 19997 | The judiciary must be separate from the legislature, to avoid arbitrary power [Montesquieu] |
| 19965 | The fundamental laws of a democracy decide who can vote [Montesquieu] |
| 19968 | It is basic to a democracy that the people themselves must name their ministers [Montesquieu] |
| 19969 | Voting should be public, so the lower classes can be influenced by the example of notable people [Montesquieu] |
| 19999 | All citizens (apart from the very humble poor) should choose their representatives [Montesquieu] |
| 19967 | In a democracy the people should manage themselves, and only delegate what they can't do [Montesquieu] |
| 19966 | A democratic assembly must have a fixed number, to see whether everyone has spoken [Montesquieu] |
| 19998 | If deputies represent people, they are accountable, but less so if they represent places [Montesquieu] |
| 20003 | Slaves are not members of the society, so no law can forbid them to run away [Montesquieu] |
| 20000 | Slavery is entirely bad; the master abandons the virtues, and they are pointless in the slave [Montesquieu] |
| 20006 | The demand for slavery is just the masters' demand for luxury [Montesquieu] |
| 20009 | Freedom of speech and writing, within the law, is essential to preserve liberty [Montesquieu] |
| 19994 | Freedom in society is ability to do what is right, and not having to do what is wrong [Montesquieu] |
| 19981 | No one even thinks of equality in monarchies and despotism; they all want superiority [Montesquieu] |
| 19991 | Equality is not command by everyone or no one, but command and obedience among equals [Montesquieu] |
| 19990 | Democracy is corrupted by lack of equality, or by extreme equality (between rulers and ruled) [Montesquieu] |
| 19983 | Democracies may sometimes need to restrict equality [Montesquieu] |
| 19982 | Some equality can be achieved by social categories, combined with taxes and poor relief [Montesquieu] |
| 19959 | Prior to positive laws there is natural equity, of obedience, gratitude, dependence and merit [Montesquieu] |
| 19960 | Sensation gives animals natural laws, but knowledge can make them break them [Montesquieu] |
| 20002 | The death penalty is permissible, because its victims enjoyed the protection of that law [Montesquieu] |
| 20010 | If religion teaches determinism, penalties must be severe; if free will, then that is different [Montesquieu] |
| 20001 | The only right victors have over captives is the protection of the former [Montesquieu] |
| 19973 | The clergy are essential to a monarchy, but dangerous in a republic [Montesquieu] |
| 19987 | Religion has the most influence in despotic states, and reinforces veneration for the ruler [Montesquieu] |
| 20011 | Religion can support the state when the law fails to do so [Montesquieu] |
| 20004 | French slavery was accepted because it was the best method of religious conversion [Montesquieu] |
| 19979 | In monarchies education ennobles people, and in despotisms it debases them [Montesquieu] |
| 19957 | Teaching is the best practice of the general virtue that leads us to love everyone [Montesquieu] |
| 8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
| 3535 | All observable causes are merely epiphenomena [Kim] |
| 3401 | A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim] |
| 8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
| 8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
| 8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
| 3407 | Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim] |
| 19958 | Laws are the necessary relations that derive from the nature of things [Montesquieu] |
| 4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |