Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for James Baillie, C. Anthony Anderson and E Reck / M Price

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28 ideas

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
10170 While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
18767 Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
10166 ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
3299 In logic identity involves reflexivity (x=x), symmetry (if x=y, then y=x) and transitivity (if x=y and y=z, then x=z) [Baillie]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
10175 Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price]
18763 Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
18771 Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
10165 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
10174 Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
10164 Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
10172 Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
10167 Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
10169 Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price]
10179 There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price]
10181 Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price]
10182 There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
10168 Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price]
10178 Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
10176 Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price]
10177 Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
10171 The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
18769 Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
18770 We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
10173 A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
18766 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA]
18768 We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
18765 Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
18764 The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA]