37 ideas
18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
18004 | We can't do philosophy without knowledge of types and categories [Ryle] |
13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
3299 | In logic identity involves reflexivity (x=x), symmetry (if x=y, then y=x) and transitivity (if x=y and y=z, then x=z) [Baillie] |
10800 | The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Ryle, by Quine] |
13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle] |
14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle] |
1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle] |
2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle] |
2620 | Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle] |
2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle] |
13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
7096 | We may still admire a person's character even if the traits are involuntary [Statman] |
7098 | There is a new sort of moral scepticism, about the possibility of moral theories [Statman] |
7099 | With a broad concept of flourishing, it might be possible without the virtues [Statman] |
7100 | Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman] |
7102 | Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman] |
7095 | Moral education is better by concrete example than abstract principle [Statman] |
7094 | Friends express friendship even when no utility is involved [Statman] |
7093 | Behaviour may be disgusting or inhumane, but violate no duty [Statman] |
7104 | The ancients recognised imperfect duties, but we have added perfect duties like justice [Statman] |
7103 | Abortion issues focus on the mother's right over her body, and the status of the foetus [Statman] |