72 ideas
6979 | Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson] |
6980 | Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson] |
6983 | Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson] |
14707 | Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter] |
7005 | Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson] |
6994 | Truth supervenes on being [Jackson] |
14352 | '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson] |
6984 | Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson] |
6978 | Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson] |
6993 | Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson] |
8499 | Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson] |
8500 | Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson] |
14633 | How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson] |
14635 | An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson] |
14632 | Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson] |
6987 | We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson] |
14703 | Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter] |
14360 | Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson] |
14288 | 'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington] |
13769 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington] |
13858 | The truth-functional account of conditionals is right, if the antecedent is really acceptable [Jackson, by Edgington] |
14289 | There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent [Jackson, by Edgington] |
14353 | Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson] |
14354 | When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson] |
14355 | (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson] |
14358 | In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson] |
14359 | Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson] |
14357 | Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson] |
14356 | We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson] |
14631 | How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson] |
14714 | Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter] |
6988 | Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson] |
6975 | Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson] |
6982 | Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson] |
14704 | 2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter] |
6991 | We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson] |
4894 | I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry on Jackson] |
4895 | Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry on Jackson] |
4886 | Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge [Jackson] |
6976 | In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson] |
6986 | Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson] |
6992 | If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson] |
7880 | If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson] |
7378 | No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson] |
7377 | Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson] |
6996 | Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson] |
6977 | Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson] |
6990 | Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson] |
14706 | Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter] |
14711 | Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter] |
6985 | Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson] |
14717 | Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter] |
14720 | Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter] |
6995 | Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson] |
14695 | Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter] |
6989 | I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson] |
14696 | Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter] |
14697 | 'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter] |
14698 | Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter] |
14699 | Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter] |
14709 | Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter] |
14719 | In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter] |
14701 | Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter] |
14702 | If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter] |
14705 | Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter] |
14715 | 2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter] |
14716 | 2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter] |
6998 | Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson] |
6997 | Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson] |
7000 | Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson] |
20723 | Only when working people are poor do they remain obedient to God [Calvin, by Weber] |
6999 | It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson] |