110 ideas
7113 | Phenomenology assumes that all consciousness is of something [Sartre] |
15186 | In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values [Le Poidevin] |
22919 | A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist [Le Poidevin] |
22227 | For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle] |
7114 | The consciousness that says 'I think' is not the consciousness that thinks [Sartre] |
7112 | The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre] |
7119 | Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre] |
20743 | Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre] |
15207 | We want illuminating theories, rather than coherent theories [Le Poidevin] |
22926 | In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive [Le Poidevin] |
7122 | We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre] |
7125 | A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre] |
7108 | The eternal truth of 2+2=4 is what gives unity to the mind which regularly thinks it [Sartre] |
24016 | Consciousness always transcends itself [Sartre] |
6151 | Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
7111 | Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre] |
22226 | Since we are a consciousness, Sartre entirely rejected the unconscious mind [Sartre, by Daigle] |
7107 | Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre] |
3847 | Man is nothing else but the sum of his actions [Sartre] |
7109 | If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre] |
7106 | The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre] |
7117 | How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre] |
7123 | Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre] |
22225 | My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre] |
7116 | When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre] |
7124 | The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre] |
7120 | It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre] |
7110 | If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre] |
7115 | Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre] |
7121 | The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre] |
3846 | Man IS freedom [Sartre] |
24013 | An emotion and its object form a unity, so emotion is a mode of apprehension [Sartre] |
24017 | Emotion is one of our modes of understanding our Being-in-the-World [Sartre] |
24014 | Emotions are a sort of bodily incantation which brings a magic to the world [Sartre] |
24015 | Emotions makes us believe in and live in a new world [Sartre] |
6164 | Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
22932 | We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world [Le Poidevin] |
7074 | Man is a useless passion [Sartre] |
6687 | Man is the desire to be God [Sartre] |
3843 | There is no human nature [Sartre] |
20762 | There are no values to justify us, and no excuses [Sartre] |
3852 | If values depend on us, freedom is the foundation of all values [Sartre] |
22228 | Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle] |
6866 | It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin] |
22233 | Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre] |
15190 | Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil [Le Poidevin] |
20764 | In becoming what we want to be we create what we think man ought to be [Sartre] |
3848 | Cowards are responsible for their cowardice [Sartre] |
20763 | When my personal freedom becomes involved, I must want freedom for everyone else [Sartre] |
6867 | Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin] |
22229 | Existentialists says that cowards and heroes make themselves [Sartre] |
20755 | Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre] |
3842 | Existence before essence (or begin with the subjective) [Sartre] |
6868 | 'Existence precedes essence' means we have no pre-existing self, but create it through existence [Sartre, by Le Poidevin] |
3844 | Existentialism says man is whatever he makes of himself [Sartre] |
22232 | Authenticity is taking responsibility for a situation, with all its risks and emotions [Sartre] |
20760 | Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho] |
22231 | We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre] |
20754 | It is dishonest to offer passions as an excuse [Sartre] |
22230 | Sartre gradually realised that freedom is curtailed by the weight of situation [Sartre, by Daigle] |
6571 | When a man must choose between his mother and the Resistance, no theory can help [Sartre, by Fogelin] |
3851 | If I do not choose, that is still a choice [Sartre] |
20491 | States have a monopoly of legitimate violence [Sartre, by Wolff,J] |
22808 | Liberalism is minimal government, or individual rights, or equality [Avineri/De-Shalit] |
22803 | Can individualist theories justify an obligation to fight in a war? [Avineri/De-Shalit] |
22804 | Autonomy is better achieved within a community [Avineri/De-Shalit] |
22806 | Communitarians avoid oppression for the common good, by means of small mediating communities [Avineri/De-Shalit] |
22807 | If our values are given to us by society then we have no grounds to criticise them [Avineri/De-Shalit] |
21240 | The truth about events always comes from the oppressed and disadvantaged [Sartre, by Bakewell] |
22927 | The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity [Le Poidevin] |
22922 | We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist [Le Poidevin] |
22924 | If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition [Le Poidevin] |
22923 | Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths [Le Poidevin] |
22928 | For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space [Le Poidevin] |
22931 | We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment [Le Poidevin] |
22917 | Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length [Le Poidevin] |
22921 | Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending [Le Poidevin] |
15195 | If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin] |
15188 | If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense [Le Poidevin] |
22934 | Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process' [Le Poidevin] |
15191 | At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed [Le Poidevin] |
15197 | Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language [Le Poidevin] |
15206 | It is the view of the future that really decides between tensed and tenseless views of time [Le Poidevin] |
15198 | In the B-series, time-positions are unchanging; in the A-series they change (from future to present to past) [Le Poidevin] |
15189 | Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin] |
6865 | A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin] |
15192 | We share a common now, but not a common here [Le Poidevin] |
15187 | It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past [Le Poidevin] |
15205 | Tensed theorists typically try to reduce the tenseless to the tensed [Le Poidevin] |
15193 | The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin] |
22938 | To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin] |
22940 | If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin] |
22939 | The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin] |
22947 | An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later [Le Poidevin] |
22952 | If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected? [Le Poidevin] |
22953 | Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect [Le Poidevin] |
22951 | If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events [Le Poidevin] |
22948 | There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time [Le Poidevin] |
22949 | Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete [Le Poidevin] |
22950 | If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable [Le Poidevin] |
22943 | Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere [Le Poidevin] |
22945 | The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times [Le Poidevin] |
22937 | If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers [Le Poidevin] |
22925 | The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present [Le Poidevin] |
22944 | The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants [Le Poidevin] |
22942 | If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short [Le Poidevin] |
22946 | The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces [Le Poidevin] |
15196 | God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems [Le Poidevin] |
22941 | How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient? [Le Poidevin] |
3845 | Without God there is no intelligibility or value [Sartre] |