65 ideas
18559 | Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact [Machery] |
17423 | The essence of natural numbers must reflect all the functions they perform [Sicha] |
17425 | To know how many, you need a numerical quantifier, as well as equinumerosity [Sicha] |
17424 | Counting puts an initial segment of a serial ordering 1-1 with some other entities [Sicha] |
18564 | Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals? [Machery] |
18604 | Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different? [Machery] |
18573 | For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts [Machery] |
18602 | A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws [Machery] |
18565 | There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip [Machery] |
18570 | There may be several ways to individuate things like concepts [Machery] |
18616 | If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification [Machery] |
18614 | Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories [Machery] |
18615 | Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind [Machery] |
18609 | Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another [Machery] |
18610 | 'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them [Machery] |
7439 | The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong] |
8353 | Freedom involves acting according to an idea [Anscombe] |
8352 | To believe in determinism, one must believe in a system which determines events [Anscombe] |
18562 | Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes [Machery] |
18561 | We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order' [Machery] |
18574 | Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery] |
18588 | Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery] |
18611 | We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery] |
18567 | In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery] |
18569 | In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery] |
18563 | By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure [Machery] |
18558 | Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location [Machery] |
18557 | Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements [Machery] |
18560 | Psychologist treat concepts as categories [Machery] |
18592 | The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate [Machery] |
18566 | Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery] |
18584 | One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery] |
18585 | Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery] |
18578 | Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery] |
18575 | The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery] |
18591 | Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery] |
18583 | Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery] |
18590 | Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery] |
18594 | Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction [Machery] |
18593 | The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation [Machery] |
18595 | Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype [Machery] |
18596 | Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype [Machery] |
18603 | Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties [Machery] |
18605 | It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars [Machery] |
18606 | The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise [Machery] |
18597 | Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular [Machery] |
18598 | Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them [Machery] |
18599 | In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars [Machery] |
18600 | Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership [Machery] |
18601 | Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains [Machery] |
18607 | Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities [Machery] |
18608 | If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have [Machery] |
18587 | The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach [Machery] |
18577 | The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition [Machery] |
18589 | For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names [Machery] |
18612 | Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery] |
20041 | Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe] |
8070 | It would be better to point to failings of character, than to moral wrongness of actions [Anscombe] |
8065 | 'Ought' and 'right' are survivals from earlier ethics, and should be jettisoned [Anscombe] |
8069 | Between Aristotle and us, a Judaeo-Christian legal conception of ethics was developed [Anscombe] |
18613 | Artifacts can be natural kinds, when they are the object of historical enquiry [Machery] |
8351 | With diseases we easily trace a cause from an effect, but we cannot predict effects [Anscombe] |
4777 | The word 'cause' is an abstraction from a group of causal terms in a language (scrape, push..) [Anscombe] |
10363 | Causation is relative to how we describe the primary relata [Anscombe, by Schaffer,J] |
8350 | Since Mill causation has usually been explained by necessary and sufficient conditions [Anscombe] |