31 ideas
5750 | Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia] |
5737 | Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia] |
5744 | First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia] |
5740 | Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia] |
5741 | If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia] |
17423 | The essence of natural numbers must reflect all the functions they perform [Sicha] |
17425 | To know how many, you need a numerical quantifier, as well as equinumerosity [Sicha] |
17424 | Counting puts an initial segment of a serial ordering 1-1 with some other entities [Sicha] |
5735 | Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia] |
5736 | No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia] |
5746 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia] |
5738 | We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia] |
5732 | 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia] |
5739 | Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia] |
5734 | Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia] |
5742 | In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia] |
5743 | If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia] |
5749 | Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia] |
5751 | The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia] |
7439 | The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong] |
8353 | Freedom involves acting according to an idea [Anscombe] |
8352 | To believe in determinism, one must believe in a system which determines events [Anscombe] |
5748 | We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia] |
20041 | Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe] |
8070 | It would be better to point to failings of character, than to moral wrongness of actions [Anscombe] |
8065 | 'Ought' and 'right' are survivals from earlier ethics, and should be jettisoned [Anscombe] |
8069 | Between Aristotle and us, a Judaeo-Christian legal conception of ethics was developed [Anscombe] |
8351 | With diseases we easily trace a cause from an effect, but we cannot predict effects [Anscombe] |
4777 | The word 'cause' is an abstraction from a group of causal terms in a language (scrape, push..) [Anscombe] |
10363 | Causation is relative to how we describe the primary relata [Anscombe, by Schaffer,J] |
8350 | Since Mill causation has usually been explained by necessary and sufficient conditions [Anscombe] |