19 ideas
11022 | Gentzen introduced a natural deduction calculus (NK) in 1934 [Gentzen, by Read] |
11065 | The inferential role of a logical constant constitutes its meaning [Gentzen, by Hanna] |
11023 | The logical connectives are 'defined' by their introduction rules [Gentzen] |
11213 | Each logical symbol has an 'introduction' rule to define it, and hence an 'elimination' rule [Gentzen] |
13832 | Natural deduction shows the heart of reasoning (and sequent calculus is just a tool) [Gentzen, by Hacking] |
10067 | Gentzen proved the consistency of arithmetic from assumptions beyond arithmetic [Gentzen, by Musgrave] |
9295 | Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann] |
19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |
19555 | People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee] |
19556 | Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee] |
19557 | Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee] |
12890 | That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee] |
12892 | Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee] |
9293 | Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann] |
9292 | The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann] |
9294 | No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann] |