15 ideas
| 10196 | The Axiom of Choice needs a criterion of choice [Black] |
| 9295 | Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann] |
| 10194 | Two things can only be distinguished by a distinct property or a distinct relation [Black] |
| 13437 | A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois] |
| 16233 | Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois] |
| 16025 | If things change they become different - but then no one thing undergoes the change! [Gallois] |
| 16026 | 4D: time is space-like; a thing is its history; past and future are real; or things extend in time [Gallois] |
| 14755 | Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider] |
| 10193 | The 'property' of self-identity is uselessly tautological [Black] |
| 16231 | Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley] |
| 16027 | If two things are equal, each side involves a necessity, so the equality is necessary [Gallois] |
| 10195 | If the universe just held two indiscernibles spheres, that refutes the Identity of Indiscernibles [Black] |
| 9293 | Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann] |
| 9294 | No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann] |
| 9292 | The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann] |