67 ideas
501 | Reason is a more powerful persuader than gold [Democritus (attr)] |
10482 | The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos] |
10492 | A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos] |
18192 | Do the Replacement Axioms exceed the iterative conception of sets? [Boolos, by Maddy] |
7785 | The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos] |
10485 | Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos] |
10484 | The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos] |
13547 | Limitation of Size is weak (Fs only collect is something the same size does) or strong (fewer Fs than objects) [Boolos, by Potter] |
10699 | Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos] |
14249 | Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic [Boolos, by Oliver/Smiley] |
10225 | Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10830 | Second-order logic metatheory is set-theoretic, and second-order validity has set-theoretic problems [Boolos] |
10736 | Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
10780 | Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
10829 | A sentence can't be a truth of logic if it asserts the existence of certain sets [Boolos] |
10697 | Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos] |
10832 | '∀x x=x' only means 'everything is identical to itself' if the range of 'everything' is fixed [Boolos] |
13671 | Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10267 | We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10698 | Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos] |
7806 | Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA] |
10834 | Weak completeness: if it is valid, it is provable. Strong: it is provable from a set of sentences [Boolos] |
13841 | Why should compactness be definitive of logic? [Boolos, by Hacking] |
10491 | Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos] |
10483 | Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos] |
10833 | Many concepts can only be expressed by second-order logic [Boolos] |
10490 | Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos] |
10700 | First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos] |
10488 | It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos] |
10487 | I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos] |
10489 | We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos] |
8693 | An 'abstraction principle' says two things are identical if they are 'equivalent' in some respect [Boolos] |
514 | Beauty is merely animal without intelligence [Democritus (attr)] |
525 | Behave well when alone, and feel shame in you own eyes [Democritus (attr)] |
502 | Good breeding in men means having a good character [Democritus (attr)] |
507 | Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
5901 | Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham] |
505 | Good and true are the same for everyone, but pleasures differ [Democritus (attr)] |
5934 | Of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure, only intensity and duration matter [Ross on Bentham] |
5271 | Prejudice apart, push-pin has equal value with music and poetry [Bentham] |
521 | We should only choose pleasures which are concerned with the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
508 | Only accept beneficial pleasures [Democritus (attr)] |
520 | The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works [Democritus (attr)] |
522 | Moderation brings more pleasures, and so increases pleasure [Democritus (attr)] |
506 | Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not an adult [Democritus (attr)] |
3777 | Pleasure and pain control all human desires and duties [Bentham] |
523 | It is as brave to master pleasure as to overcome the enemy [Democritus (attr)] |
503 | Virtue doesn't just avoid evil, but also doesn't desire it [Democritus (attr)] |
518 | A bad life is just a drawn-out death [Democritus (attr)] |
497 | Be virtuous from duty, not from fear [Democritus (attr)] |
499 | Repentance of shameful deeds is salvation [Democritus (attr)] |
524 | Virtue comes more from practice than from nature [Democritus (attr)] |
519 | One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds [Democritus (attr)] |
500 | The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the person wronged [Democritus (attr)] |
1539 | The endless desire for money is a crueller slavery than poverty [Democritus (attr)] |
526 | Small appetite makes poverty equal to wealth [Democritus (attr)] |
511 | It is better to have one intelligent friend than many unintelligent [Democritus (attr)] |
498 | It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty [Democritus (attr)] |
3554 | Bentham thinks happiness is feeling good, but why use morality to achieve that? [Annas on Bentham] |
3781 | The value of pleasures and pains is their force [Bentham] |
20977 | Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham] |
3778 | The community's interest is a sum of individual interests [Bentham] |
1541 | It is better to be poor in a democracy than be rich without freedom [Democritus (attr)] |
21003 | Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham] |
20280 | Large mature animals are more rational than babies. But all that really matters is - can they suffer? [Bentham] |
3779 | Unnatural, when it means anything, means infrequent [Bentham] |
3780 | We must judge a thing morally to know if it conforms to God's will [Bentham] |