21 ideas
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
7401 | Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world [Galileo, by Tuck] |
5454 | Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures [Galileo] |
16560 | Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes [Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
5901 | Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham] |
5934 | Of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure, only intensity and duration matter [Ross on Bentham] |
5271 | Prejudice apart, push-pin has equal value with music and poetry [Bentham] |
3777 | Pleasure and pain control all human desires and duties [Bentham] |
3554 | Bentham thinks happiness is feeling good, but why use morality to achieve that? [Annas on Bentham] |
3781 | The value of pleasures and pains is their force [Bentham] |
20977 | Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham] |
3778 | The community's interest is a sum of individual interests [Bentham] |
21003 | Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham] |
20280 | Large mature animals are more rational than babies. But all that really matters is - can they suffer? [Bentham] |
3779 | Unnatural, when it means anything, means infrequent [Bentham] |
3645 | To understand the universe mathematics is essential [Galileo] |
19673 | Galileo mathematised movement, and revealed its invariable component - acceleration [Galileo, by Meillassoux] |
3780 | We must judge a thing morally to know if it conforms to God's will [Bentham] |