Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jeremy Bentham, Joseph Priestley and Dorothy Edgington

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42 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' [Edgington]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
We get the idea of power by abstracting from ropes, magnets and electric shocks [Priestley]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington]
Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [Edgington, by McFetridge]
An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington]
A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington]
Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind [Edgington]
Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives [Edgington]
There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics [Edgington]
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington]
The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true [Edgington]
Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington]
X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington]
Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington]
I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington]
On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington]
Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure, only intensity and duration matter [Ross on Bentham]
Prejudice apart, push-pin has equal value with music and poetry [Bentham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Pleasure and pain control all human desires and duties [Bentham]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
Bentham thinks happiness is feeling good, but why use morality to achieve that? [Annas on Bentham]
The value of pleasures and pains is their force [Bentham]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The community's interest is a sum of individual interests [Bentham]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Large mature animals are more rational than babies. But all that really matters is - can they suffer? [Bentham]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Unnatural, when it means anything, means infrequent [Bentham]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Attraction or repulsion are not imparted to matter, but actually constitute it [Priestley]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
We must judge a thing morally to know if it conforms to God's will [Bentham]