Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jeremy Bentham, Quassim Cassam and Max Black

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22 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The Axiom of Choice needs a criterion of choice [Black]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Two things can only be distinguished by a distinct property or a distinct relation [Black]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
The 'property' of self-identity is uselessly tautological [Black]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If the universe just held two indiscernibles spheres, that refutes the Identity of Indiscernibles [Black]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
If we have a pain, we are strongly aware of the bodily self [Cassam]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Outer senses are as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge [Cassam]
Is there a mode of self-awareness that isn't perception, and could it give self-knowledge? [Cassam]
Neither self-consciousness nor self-reference require self-knowledge [Cassam]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
We can't introspect ourselves as objects, because that would involve possible error [Cassam]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure, only intensity and duration matter [Ross on Bentham]
Prejudice apart, push-pin has equal value with music and poetry [Bentham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Pleasure and pain control all human desires and duties [Bentham]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
Bentham thinks happiness is feeling good, but why use morality to achieve that? [Annas on Bentham]
The value of pleasures and pains is their force [Bentham]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The community's interest is a sum of individual interests [Bentham]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Large mature animals are more rational than babies. But all that really matters is - can they suffer? [Bentham]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Unnatural, when it means anything, means infrequent [Bentham]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
We must judge a thing morally to know if it conforms to God's will [Bentham]