404 ideas
11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
11461 | 323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG] |
11390 | 1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG] |
11391 | 750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG] |
11392 | 586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG] |
11395 | 570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG] |
11396 | 563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG] |
11398 | 540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG] |
11400 | 529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG] |
11403 | 500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG] |
11404 | 496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG] |
11408 | 472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG] |
11412 | 450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG] |
11414 | 445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG] |
11417 | 436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG] |
11535 | 170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG] |
11537 | -200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG] |
11541 | 263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG] |
11545 | 310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG] |
11549 | 387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG] |
11555 | 523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG] |
11557 | 529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG] |
11421 | 427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG] |
11425 | 399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG] |
11432 | 387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG] |
11433 | 387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG] |
11440 | 367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG] |
11443 | 360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG] |
11445 | 347: death of Plato [PG] |
11454 | 343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG] |
11456 | 335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG] |
11459 | 330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG] |
11465 | 322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG] |
11468 | 307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG] |
11470 | 301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG] |
11483 | 261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG] |
11486 | 229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG] |
11492 | 157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG] |
11509 | 85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG] |
11513 | 78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG] |
11516 | 60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG] |
11528 | 65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG] |
11531 | 80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG] |
11564 | 1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG] |
11558 | 622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG] |
11559 | 642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG] |
11560 | 910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
11562 | 1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG] |
11566 | 1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG] |
11573 | 1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
11581 | 1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG] |
11586 | 1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG] |
11591 | 1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG] |
17916 | 1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG] |
11593 | 1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG] |
11596 | 1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG] |
11599 | 1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG] |
11601 | 1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG] |
11607 | 1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG] |
11613 | 1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG] |
11614 | 1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG] |
11619 | 1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG] |
11623 | 1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG] |
11626 | 1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG] |
11627 | 1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG] |
11633 | 1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG] |
11634 | 1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG] |
11643 | 1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG] |
11649 | 1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
11652 | 1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG] |
11654 | 1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG] |
11659 | 1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG] |
11666 | 1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG] |
11667 | 1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG] |
11675 | 1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG] |
11682 | 1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG] |
11683 | 1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG] |
11687 | 1798: the French Revolution [PG] |
11694 | 1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG] |
11701 | 1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG] |
11710 | 1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG] |
11713 | 1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG] |
11715 | 1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG] |
11717 | 1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG] |
11721 | 1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG] |
11724 | 1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG] |
11733 | 1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG] |
17907 | 1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG] |
17909 | 1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG] |
17908 | 1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG] |
11735 | 1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG] |
17911 | 1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG] |
11740 | 1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG] |
11742 | 1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG] |
11745 | 1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG] |
17917 | 1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG] |
17919 | 1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG] |
11804 | 1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG] |
17921 | 1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG] |
11808 | 1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG] |
11810 | 1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG] |
11813 | 1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG] |
17920 | 1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG] |
11820 | 1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG] |
11746 | 1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG] |
11747 | 1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG] |
17910 | 1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG] |
11752 | 1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
11756 | 1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG] |
11762 | 1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG] |
11765 | 1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG] |
11768 | 1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG] |
11770 | 1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG] |
11773 | 1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG] |
11783 | 1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG] |
11784 | 1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG] |
11787 | 1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG] |
17918 | 1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG] |
11794 | 1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG] |
12644 | Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor] |
12633 | Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor] |
2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
4465 | Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG] |
11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
2463 | A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor] |
12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
4686 | Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG] |
7415 | Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG] |
7414 | What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG] |
6696 | The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG] |
2435 | Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor] |
4687 | Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG] |
2442 | Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor] |
12664 | A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor] |
3005 | 'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor] |
12648 | Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor] |
12650 | 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor] |
12656 | P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor] |
6516 | Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG] |
12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
7014 | A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties [Fodor] |
12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
12653 | There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor] |
24054 | Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG] |
12651 | Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor] |
2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
12628 | Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor] |
3875 | If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG] |
2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
3009 | Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals [Fodor] |
3008 | Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial [Fodor] |
2990 | Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned [Fodor] |
3876 | If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG] |
2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
12625 | Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor] |
2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
2462 | Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor] |
2460 | Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor] |
2454 | We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor] |
2455 | Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor] |
2461 | An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor] |
2458 | Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor] |
2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
12636 | Mental states have causal powers [Fodor] |
2994 | In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor] |
2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
2453 | We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor] |
15473 | How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB] |
2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
2981 | Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor] |
7326 | Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things [Fodor] |
15494 | We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining [Fodor] |
3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
12661 | The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor] |
2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
2445 | Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor] |
2446 | Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor] |
2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
3001 | Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor] |
2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
2993 | Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor] |
12632 | In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor] |
3011 | Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor] |
5498 | Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Fodor, by Lycan] |
2597 | Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor] |
2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
2995 | Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor] |
2464 | Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor] |
2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
2447 | Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor] |
2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
12624 | Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor] |
2991 | Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor] |
3002 | If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor] |
2598 | Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor] |
3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
7734 | Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG] |
7735 | Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG] |
2992 | We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor] |
2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
12641 | Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor] |
12640 | Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor] |
2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
2988 | Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor] |
3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
2450 | Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor] |
2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
22186 | Mental modules are specialised, automatic, and isolated [Fodor, by Okasha] |
2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
12643 | Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor] |
2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
3010 | Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor] |
8090 | Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Fodor, by Devlin] |
2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
2604 | We must have expressive power BEFORE we learn language [Fodor] |
11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
12647 | Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor] |
12649 | We think in file names [Fodor] |
3135 | Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey] |
12655 | Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor] |
2983 | Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor] |
12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
12630 | If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor] |
2437 | XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor] |
3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
2441 | Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor] |
2999 | Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor] |
3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
3012 | Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor] |
2452 | Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor] |
2432 | Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor] |
11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
12658 | Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor] |
11143 | If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence] |
6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
12662 | We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor] |
12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
2438 | In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor] |
12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
12626 | Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor] |
11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
12637 | Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor] |
12638 | If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor] |
12639 | Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor] |
11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
12654 | You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor] |
12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
12659 | Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor] |
12660 | One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor] |
11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |
11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
12629 | For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor] |
12631 | Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor] |
11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
12657 | Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor] |
2439 | Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor] |
2457 | If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor] |
2998 | Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor] |
2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
3006 | Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor] |
2451 | To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor] |
3007 | Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor] |
3004 | The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor] |
3000 | Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor] |
2433 | For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor] |
2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
3003 | Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor] |
12634 | 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor] |
2996 | Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor] |
12642 | Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor] |
12663 | We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor] |
2436 | It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor] |
2434 | Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor] |
12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
12645 | Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor] |
12646 | Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor] |
2459 | Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor] |
2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
12627 | Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor] |
3877 | Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG] |
3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |
6126 | Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG] |
3874 | How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG] |
3873 | An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG] |