556 ideas
| 12644 | Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor] |
| 13876 | The syntactic category is primary, and the ontological category is derivative [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 12633 | Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor] |
| 8415 | Never lose sight of the distinction between concept and object [Frege] |
| 2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
| 9841 | Frege was the first to give linguistic answers to non-linguistic questions [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9840 | Frege initiated linguistic philosophy, studying number through the sense of sentences [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 15948 | Frege developed formal systems to avoid unnoticed assumptions [Frege, by Lavine] |
| 22270 | Frege changed philosophy by extending logic's ability to check the grounds of thinking [Potter on Frege] |
| 2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
| 10804 | Thoughts have a natural order, to which human thinking is drawn [Frege, by Yablo] |
| 9832 | Frege sees no 'intersubjective' category, between objective and subjective [Dummett on Frege] |
| 8414 | Keep the psychological and subjective separate from the logical and objective [Frege] |
| 7740 | There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
| 2463 | A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor] |
| 8939 | We should not describe human laws of thought, but how to correctly track truth [Frege, by Fisher] |
| 9821 | A definition need not capture the sense of an expression - just get the reference right [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 13886 | Later Frege held that definitions must fix a function's value for every possible argument [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 16877 | A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege] |
| 9844 | Originally Frege liked contextual definitions, but later preferred them fully explicit [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9822 | Nothing should be defined in terms of that to which it is conceptually prior [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9845 | We can't define a word by defining an expression containing it, as the remaining parts are a problem [Frege] |
| 11219 | Frege suggested that mathematics should only accept stipulative definitions [Frege, by Gupta] |
| 10019 | Only what is logically complex can be defined; what is simple must be pointed to [Frege] |
| 12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
| 2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
| 17495 | Proof aims to remove doubts, but also to show the interdependence of truths [Frege] |
| 16878 | We must be clear about every premise and every law used in a proof [Frege] |
| 8632 | You can't transfer external properties unchanged to apply to ideas [Frege] |
| 19466 | The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege] |
| 2435 | Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor] |
| 8187 | Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 22317 | Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege] |
| 13881 | We need to grasp not number-objects, but the states of affairs which make number statements true [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 10354 | Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts [Kusch] |
| 19465 | There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege] |
| 10353 | Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets [Kusch] |
| 19468 | The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege] |
| 18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
| 9154 | Frege agreed with Euclid that the axioms of logic and mathematics are known through self-evidence [Frege, by Burge] |
| 9585 | Since every definition is an equation, one cannot define equality itself [Frege] |
| 4971 | I don't use 'subject' and 'predicate' in my way of representing a judgement [Frege] |
| 17745 | For Frege, 'All A's are B's' means that the concept A implies the concept B [Frege, by Walicki] |
| 13455 | Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
| 9157 | The null set is only defensible if it is the extension of an empty concept [Frege, by Burge] |
| 16895 | The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge] |
| 9835 | It is because a concept can be empty that there is such a thing as the empty class [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 14238 | A class is an aggregate of objects; if you destroy them, you destroy the class; there is no empty class [Frege] |
| 9854 | We can introduce new objects, as equivalence classes of objects already known [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9883 | Frege introduced the standard device, of defining logical objects with equivalence classes [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 18104 | Frege, unlike Russell, has infinite individuals because numbers are individuals [Frege, by Bostock] |
| 9834 | A class is, for Frege, the extension of a concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 3328 | Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
| 7728 | Frege has a judgement stroke (vertical, asserting or judging) and a content stroke (horizontal, expressing) [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 16881 | The laws of logic are boundless, so we want the few whose power contains the others [Frege] |
| 7622 | In 1879 Frege developed second order logic [Frege, by Putnam] |
| 9179 | Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 16867 | Logic not only proves things, but also reveals logical relations between them [Frege] |
| 2442 | Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor] |
| 16863 | Does some mathematical reasoning (such as mathematical induction) not belong to logic? [Frege] |
| 16862 | The closest subject to logic is mathematics, which does little apart from drawing inferences [Frege] |
| 13473 | Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
| 4975 | A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege] |
| 7729 | Frege replaced Aristotle's subject/predicate form with function/argument form [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 8645 | Convert "Jupiter has four moons" into "the number of Jupiter's moons is four" [Frege] |
| 12664 | A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor] |
| 8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
| 8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
| 6076 | For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn] |
| 3319 | Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
| 16891 | Despite Gödel, Frege's epistemic ordering of all the truths is still plausible [Frege, by Burge] |
| 16906 | The primitive simples of arithmetic are the essence, determining the subject, and its boundaries [Frege, by Jeshion] |
| 16865 | 'Theorems' are both proved, and used in proofs [Frege] |
| 8447 | In 'Etna is higher than Vesuvius' the whole of Etna, including all the lava, can't be the reference [Frege] |
| 3005 | 'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor] |
| 12648 | Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor] |
| 12650 | 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor] |
| 18772 | We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege] |
| 10424 | A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury] |
| 18773 | People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege] |
| 8448 | Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense [Frege] |
| 14075 | Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard] |
| 4978 | The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege] |
| 10510 | Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale] |
| 18937 | If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer] |
| 18940 | It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege] |
| 18939 | In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege] |
| 13733 | Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9950 | A quantifier is a second-level predicate (which explains how it contributes to truth-conditions) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 9991 | For Frege the variable ranges over all objects [Frege, by Tait] |
| 10536 | Frege's domain for variables is all objects, but modern interpretations first fix the domain [Dummett on Frege] |
| 9871 | Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
| 7730 | Frege introduced quantifiers for generality [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 7742 | Frege reduced most quantifiers to 'everything' combined with 'not' [Frege, by McCullogh] |
| 9874 | Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
| 14236 | Each horse doesn't fall under the concept 'horse that draws the carriage', because all four are needed [Oliver/Smiley on Frege] |
| 13824 | Proof theory began with Frege's definition of derivability [Frege, by Prawitz] |
| 13609 | Frege produced axioms for logic, though that does not now seem the natural basis for logic [Frege, by Kaplan] |
| 16884 | Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge] |
| 9462 | Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first [Frege, by Jacquette] |
| 18936 | Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense' [Frege, by Sawyer] |
| 22294 | We can show that a concept is consistent by producing something which falls under it [Frege] |
| 16886 | The truth of an axiom must be independently recognisable [Frege] |
| 17624 | To understand axioms you must grasp their logical power and priority [Frege, by Burge] |
| 16866 | Tracing inference backwards closes in on a small set of axioms and postulates [Frege] |
| 16868 | The essence of mathematics is the kernel of primitive truths on which it rests [Frege] |
| 16870 | Axioms are truths which cannot be doubted, and for which no proof is needed [Frege] |
| 16871 | A truth can be an axiom in one system and not in another [Frege] |
| 12656 | P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor] |
| 16869 | To create order in mathematics we need a full system, guided by patterns of inference [Frege] |
| 9886 | Cardinals say how many, and reals give measurements compared to a unit quantity [Frege] |
| 18256 | Quantity is inconceivable without the idea of addition [Frege] |
| 8640 | We cannot define numbers from the idea of a series, because numbers must precede that [Frege] |
| 18252 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities, such as lengths or masses [Frege] |
| 18253 | I wish to go straight from cardinals to reals (as ratios), leaving out the rationals [Frege] |
| 9889 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9838 | Treating 0 as a number avoids antinomies involving treating 'nobody' as a person [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9564 | For Frege 'concept' and 'extension' are primitive, but 'zero' and 'successor' are defined [Frege, by Chihara] |
| 10551 | If objects exist because they fall under a concept, 0 is the object under which no objects fall [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8653 | Nought is the number belonging to the concept 'not identical with itself' [Frege] |
| 8654 | One is the Number which belongs to the concept "identical with 0" [Frege] |
| 8636 | We can say 'a and b are F' if F is 'wise', but not if it is 'one' [Frege] |
| 8641 | You can abstract concepts from the moon, but the number one is not among them [Frege] |
| 9989 | Units can be equal without being identical [Tait on Frege] |
| 17429 | Frege says only concepts which isolate and avoid arbitrary division can give units [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 17427 | Frege's 'isolation' could be absence of overlap, or drawing conceptual boundaries [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 17437 | Non-arbitrary division means that what falls under the concept cannot be divided into more of the same [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 17438 | Our concepts decide what is countable, as in seeing the leaves of the tree, or the foliage [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 17426 | A concept creating a unit must isolate and unify what falls under it [Frege] |
| 17428 | Frege says counting is determining what number belongs to a given concept [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 15916 | Frege's one-to-one correspondence replaces well-ordering, because infinities can't be counted [Frege, by Lavine] |
| 17446 | Counting rests on one-one correspondence, of numerals to objects [Frege] |
| 9582 | Husserl rests sameness of number on one-one correlation, forgetting the correlation with numbers themselves [Frege] |
| 10034 | The number of natural numbers is not a natural number [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 18271 | We can't prove everything, but we can spell out the unproved, so that foundations are clear [Frege] |
| 16883 | Arithmetical statements can't be axioms, because they are provable [Frege, by Burge] |
| 16864 | If principles are provable, they are theorems; if not, they are axioms [Frege] |
| 17855 | It may be possible to define induction in terms of the ancestral relation [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 10625 | Frege had a motive to treat numbers as objects, but not a justification [Hale/Wright on Frege] |
| 13871 | Frege claims that numbers are objects, as opposed to them being Fregean concepts [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 13872 | Numbers are second-level, ascribing properties to concepts rather than to objects [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 9816 | For Frege, successor was a relation, not a function [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9953 | Numbers are more than just 'second-level concepts', since existence is also one [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 9954 | "Number of x's such that ..x.." is a functional expression, yielding a name when completed [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 17636 | A cardinal number may be defined as a class of similar classes [Frege, by Russell] |
| 10139 | Frege gives an incoherent account of extensions resulting from abstraction [Fine,K on Frege] |
| 10028 | For Frege the number of F's is a collection of first-level concepts [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10029 | Numbers need to be objects, to define the extension of the concept of each successor to n [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 9973 | The number of F's is the extension of the second level concept 'is equipollent with F' [Frege, by Tait] |
| 16500 | Frege showed that numbers attach to concepts, not to objects [Frege, by Wiggins] |
| 9990 | Frege replaced Cantor's sets as the objects of equinumerosity attributions with concepts [Frege, by Tait] |
| 7738 | Zero is defined using 'is not self-identical', and one by using the concept of zero [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 23456 | Frege said logical predication implies classes, which are arithmetical objects [Frege, by Morris,M] |
| 13887 | Frege started with contextual definition, but then switched to explicit extensional definition [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 13897 | Each number, except 0, is the number of the concept of all of its predecessors [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 9856 | Frege's account of cardinals fails in modern set theory, so they are now defined differently [Dummett on Frege] |
| 9902 | Frege's incorrect view is that a number is an equivalence class [Benacerraf on Frege] |
| 17814 | The natural number n is the set of n-membered sets [Frege, by Yourgrau] |
| 17819 | A set doesn't have a fixed number, because the elements can be seen in different ways [Yourgrau on Frege] |
| 17460 | A statement of number contains a predication about a concept [Frege] |
| 17820 | If you can subdivide objects many ways for counting, you can do that to set-elements too [Yourgrau on Frege] |
| 16890 | Frege's problem is explaining the particularity of numbers by general laws [Frege, by Burge] |
| 8630 | Individual numbers are best derived from the number one, and increase by one [Frege] |
| 11029 | 'Exactly ten gallons' may not mean ten things instantiate 'gallon' [Rumfitt on Frege] |
| 10013 | Numerical statements have first-order logical form, so must refer to objects [Frege, by Hodes] |
| 18181 | The Number for F is the extension of 'equal to F' (or maybe just F itself) [Frege] |
| 18103 | Numbers are objects because they partake in identity statements [Frege, by Bostock] |
| 9586 | In a number-statement, something is predicated of a concept [Frege] |
| 3331 | If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege] |
| 9949 | There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10623 | Frege defined number in terms of extensions of concepts, but needed Basic Law V to explain extensions [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
| 9975 | Frege ignored Cantor's warning that a cardinal set is not just a concept-extension [Tait on Frege] |
| 10020 | Frege's biggest error is in not accounting for the senses of number terms [Hodes on Frege] |
| 10553 | A number is a class of classes of the same cardinality [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9956 | 'The number of Fs' is the extension (a collection of first-level concepts) of the concept 'equinumerous with F' [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 13527 | Frege's cardinals (equivalences of one-one correspondences) is not permissible in ZFC [Frege, by Wolf,RS] |
| 22292 | Hume's Principle fails to implicitly define numbers, because of the Julius Caesar [Frege, by Potter] |
| 17442 | Frege thinks number is fundamentally bound up with one-one correspondence [Frege, by Heck] |
| 11030 | The words 'There are exactly Julius Caesar moons of Mars' are gibberish [Rumfitt on Frege] |
| 10030 | 'Julius Caesar' isn't a number because numbers inherit properties of 0 and successor [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 8690 | From within logic, how can we tell whether an arbitrary object like Julius Caesar is a number? [Frege, by Friend] |
| 10219 | Frege said 2 is the extension of all pairs (so Julius Caesar isn't 2, because he's not an extension) [Frege, by Shapiro] |
| 13889 | Fregean numbers are numbers, and not 'Caesar', because they correlate 1-1 [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 18142 | One-one correlations imply normal arithmetic, but don't explain our concept of a number [Frege, by Bostock] |
| 9046 | Our definition will not tell us whether or not Julius Caesar is a number [Frege] |
| 16896 | If numbers can be derived from logic, then set theory is superfluous [Frege, by Burge] |
| 8639 | If numbers are supposed to be patterns, each number can have many patterns [Frege] |
| 13874 | Numbers seem to be objects because they exactly fit the inference patterns for identities [Frege] |
| 13875 | Frege's platonism proposes that objects are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 7731 | How can numbers be external (one pair of boots is two boots), or subjective (and so relative)? [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 7737 | Identities refer to objects, so numbers must be objects [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 8635 | Numbers are not physical, and not ideas - they are objective and non-sensible [Frege] |
| 8652 | Numbers are objects, because they can take the definite article, and can't be plurals [Frege] |
| 9580 | Our concepts recognise existing relations, they don't change them [Frege] |
| 9589 | Numbers are not real like the sea, but (crucially) they are still objective [Frege] |
| 17816 | Frege's logicism aimed at removing the reliance of arithmetic on intuition [Frege, by Yourgrau] |
| 9831 | Geometry appeals to intuition as the source of its axioms [Frege] |
| 8633 | There is no physical difference between two boots and one pair of boots [Frege] |
| 9577 | The naďve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap [Frege] |
| 11031 | 'Jupiter has many moons' won't read as 'The number of Jupiter's moons equals the number many' [Rumfitt on Frege] |
| 8637 | The number 'one' can't be a property, if any object can be viewed as one or not one [Frege] |
| 9999 | For science, we can translate adjectival numbers into noun form [Frege] |
| 9951 | It appears that numbers are adjectives, but they don't apply to a single object [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 9952 | Numerical adjectives are of the same second-level type as the existential quantifier [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 9945 | Logicism shows that no empirical truths are needed to justify arithmetic [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 16905 | Arithmetic must be based on logic, because of its total generality [Frege, by Jeshion] |
| 8782 | Frege offered a Platonist version of logicism, committed to cardinal and real numbers [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
| 13608 | Mathematics has no special axioms of its own, but follows from principles of logic (with definitions) [Frege, by Bostock] |
| 5658 | Numbers are definable in terms of mapping items which fall under concepts [Frege, by Scruton] |
| 18166 | The loss of my Rule V seems to make foundations for arithmetic impossible [Frege] |
| 8655 | Arithmetic is analytic and a priori, and thus it is part of logic [Frege] |
| 16880 | Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge] |
| 8689 | Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend] |
| 18165 | My Basic Law V is a law of pure logic [Frege] |
| 8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
| 7739 | Arithmetic is analytic [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 10607 | Frege's logic has a hierarchy of object, property, property-of-property etc. [Frege, by Smith,P] |
| 10831 | Frege only managed to prove that arithmetic was analytic with a logic that included set-theory [Quine on Frege] |
| 13864 | Frege's platonism and logicism are in conflict, if logic must dictates an infinity of objects [Wright,C on Frege] |
| 10033 | Why should the existence of pure logic entail the existence of objects? [George/Velleman on Frege] |
| 10010 | Frege's belief in logicism and in numerical objects seem uncomfortable together [Hodes on Frege] |
| 9545 | Late in life Frege abandoned logicism, and saw the source of arithmetic as geometrical [Frege, by Chihara] |
| 9631 | Formalism fails to recognise types of symbols, and also meta-games [Frege, by Brown,JR] |
| 9887 | Formalism misunderstands applications, metatheory, and infinity [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8751 | Only applicability raises arithmetic from a game to a science [Frege] |
| 9875 | Frege was completing Bolzano's work, of expelling intuition from number theory and analysis [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8642 | Abstraction from things produces concepts, and numbers are in the concepts [Frege] |
| 8621 | Mental states are irrelevant to mathematics, because they are vague and fluctuating [Frege] |
| 11008 | Existence is not a first-order property, but the instantiation of a property [Frege, by Read] |
| 8643 | Affirmation of existence is just denial of zero [Frege] |
| 19470 | Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege] |
| 12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
| 5657 | Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton] |
| 8911 | If abstracta are non-mental, quarks are abstracta, and yet chess and God's thoughts are mental [Rosen on Frege] |
| 8634 | The equator is imaginary, but not fictitious; thought is needed to recognise it [Frege] |
| 18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
| 18995 | Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo] |
| 17443 | Many of us find Frege's claim that truths depend on one another an obscure idea [Heck on Frege] |
| 17445 | Parallelism is intuitive, so it is more fundamental than sameness of direction [Frege, by Heck] |
| 10539 | Frege refers to 'concrete' objects, but they are no different in principle from abstract ones [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9578 | If objects are just presentation, we get increasing abstraction by ignoring their properties [Frege] |
| 19471 | A fact is a thought that is true [Frege] |
| 17431 | Vagueness is incomplete definition [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 13879 | For Frege, ontological questions are to be settled by reference to syntactic structures [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 10642 | Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects [Frege, by Linnebo] |
| 10032 | 'Ancestral' relations are derived by iterating back from a given relation [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10606 | Frege treats properties as a kind of function, and maybe a property is its characteristic function [Frege, by Smith,P] |
| 2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
| 4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
| 10317 | It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale] |
| 7014 | A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties [Fodor] |
| 12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
| 10533 | We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
| 8647 | Not all objects are spatial; 4 can still be an object, despite lacking spatial co-ordinates [Frege] |
| 10309 | Frege says singular terms denote objects, numerals are singular terms, so numbers exist [Frege, by Hale] |
| 10550 | Frege establishes abstract objects independently from concrete ones, by falling under a concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 18269 | Logical objects are extensions of concepts, or ranges of values of functions [Frege] |
| 8785 | For Frege, objects just are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
| 10278 | Without concepts we would not have any objects [Frege, by Shapiro] |
| 8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
| 10535 | Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9877 | Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 17432 | Frege's universe comes already divided into objects [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 9891 | The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege] |
| 9388 | Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege] |
| 16022 | The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege [Frege, by Noonan] |
| 11100 | Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals [Frege, by Quine] |
| 4893 | Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry] |
| 12153 | Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F [Perry on Frege] |
| 3318 | Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
| 9853 | Identity between objects is not a consequence of identity, but part of what 'identity' means [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 12653 | There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor] |
| 16885 | To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge] |
| 17623 | To understand a thought you must understand its logical structure [Frege, by Burge] |
| 10337 | We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge [Kusch] |
| 12651 | Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor] |
| 2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
| 12628 | Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor] |
| 2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
| 10357 | Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind [Kusch] |
| 9158 | For Frege a priori knowledge derives from general principles, so numbers can't be primitive [Frege] |
| 16887 | Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge] |
| 8657 | Mathematicians just accept self-evidence, whether it is logical or intuitive [Frege] |
| 3009 | Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals [Fodor] |
| 3008 | Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial [Fodor] |
| 2990 | Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned [Fodor] |
| 16894 | An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge] |
| 9352 | An a priori truth is one derived from general laws which do not require proof [Frege] |
| 16889 | A truth is a priori if it can be proved entirely from general unproven laws [Frege] |
| 2514 | Frege tried to explain synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity [Frege, by Katz] |
| 2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
| 2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
| 2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
| 3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
| 12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
| 12625 | Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor] |
| 2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
| 16900 | Intuitions cannot be communicated [Frege, by Burge] |
| 16903 | Justifications show the ordering of truths, and the foundation is what is self-evident [Frege, by Jeshion] |
| 10339 | Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch] |
| 10331 | Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch] |
| 10338 | The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch] |
| 10340 | Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch] |
| 10345 | Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch] |
| 11052 | Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief [Frege] |
| 10350 | Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch] |
| 10343 | Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason [Kusch] |
| 2462 | Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor] |
| 10341 | Justification depends on the audience and one's social role [Kusch] |
| 10325 | Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism [Kusch] |
| 10324 | Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge [Kusch] |
| 10327 | Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences [Kusch] |
| 10329 | Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories [Kusch] |
| 10330 | A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth [Kusch] |
| 10334 | Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics [Kusch] |
| 10336 | Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives [Kusch] |
| 10323 | Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people [Kusch] |
| 10348 | Private justification is justification to imagined other people [Kusch] |
| 10335 | Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism [Kusch] |
| 2461 | An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor] |
| 2460 | Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor] |
| 2454 | We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor] |
| 2455 | Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor] |
| 16882 | The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege] |
| 2458 | Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor] |
| 8624 | Induction is merely psychological, with a principle that it can actually establish laws [Frege] |
| 8626 | In science one observation can create high probability, while a thousand might prove nothing [Frege] |
| 2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
| 2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
| 12636 | Mental states have causal powers [Fodor] |
| 8648 | Ideas are not spatial, and don't have distances between them [Frege] |
| 2994 | In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor] |
| 2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
| 2453 | We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor] |
| 15473 | How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB] |
| 2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
| 2981 | Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor] |
| 7326 | Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things [Fodor] |
| 15494 | We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining [Fodor] |
| 3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
| 3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
| 12661 | The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor] |
| 2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
| 10349 | To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society [Kusch] |
| 2445 | Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor] |
| 2446 | Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor] |
| 2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
| 3001 | Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor] |
| 2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
| 2993 | Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor] |
| 12632 | In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor] |
| 3011 | Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor] |
| 5498 | Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Fodor, by Lycan] |
| 2597 | Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor] |
| 2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
| 2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
| 2995 | Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor] |
| 2464 | Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor] |
| 2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
| 2447 | Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor] |
| 2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
| 12624 | Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor] |
| 2991 | Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor] |
| 3002 | If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor] |
| 2598 | Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor] |
| 3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
| 8620 | Thought is the same everywhere, and the laws of thought do not vary [Frege] |
| 9581 | Many people have the same thought, which is the component, not the private presentation [Frege] |
| 19469 | We grasp thoughts (thinking), decide they are true (judgement), and manifest the judgement (assertion) [Frege] |
| 8162 | Thoughts have their own realm of reality - 'sense' (as opposed to the realm of 'reference') [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9818 | A thought is distinguished from other things by a capacity to be true or false [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 2992 | We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor] |
| 2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
| 12641 | Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor] |
| 12640 | Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor] |
| 2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
| 2988 | Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor] |
| 3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
| 2450 | Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor] |
| 18265 | We don't judge by combining subject and concept; we get a concept by splitting up a judgement [Frege] |
| 16379 | Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege] |
| 2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
| 2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
| 22186 | Mental modules are specialised, automatic, and isolated [Fodor, by Okasha] |
| 2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
| 2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
| 2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
| 2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
| 2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
| 2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
| 2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
| 2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
| 12643 | Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor] |
| 3010 | Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor] |
| 8090 | Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Fodor, by Devlin] |
| 2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
| 2604 | We must have expressive power BEFORE we learn language [Fodor] |
| 2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
| 16876 | We need definitions to cram retrievable sense into a signed receptacle [Frege] |
| 16875 | We use signs to mark receptacles for complex senses [Frege] |
| 12647 | Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor] |
| 12649 | We think in file names [Fodor] |
| 3135 | Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey] |
| 12655 | Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor] |
| 2983 | Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor] |
| 12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
| 12630 | If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor] |
| 2437 | XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor] |
| 3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
| 2441 | Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor] |
| 2999 | Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor] |
| 3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
| 2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
| 3012 | Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor] |
| 2452 | Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor] |
| 2432 | Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor] |
| 9870 | Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 10344 | Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch] |
| 12658 | Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor] |
| 11143 | If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence] |
| 6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
| 2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
| 12662 | We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor] |
| 12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
| 12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
| 12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
| 2438 | In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor] |
| 12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
| 2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
| 2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
| 12626 | Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor] |
| 13878 | Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 7736 | A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 17430 | Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 8622 | Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege] |
| 9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
| 8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
| 18752 | 'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee] |
| 9839 | Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9190 | A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 13665 | Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro] |
| 12637 | Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor] |
| 12638 | If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor] |
| 12639 | Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor] |
| 9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 12654 | You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor] |
| 12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
| 12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
| 12659 | Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor] |
| 12660 | One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor] |
| 12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |
| 12629 | For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor] |
| 12631 | Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor] |
| 8651 | A concept is a possible predicate of a singular judgement [Frege] |
| 4973 | As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege] |
| 9846 | Defining 'direction' by parallelism doesn't tell you whether direction is a line [Dummett on Frege] |
| 12657 | Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor] |
| 9976 | Frege accepts abstraction to the concept of all sets equipollent to a given one [Tait on Frege] |
| 9988 | If we abstract 'from' two cats, the units are not black or white, or cats [Tait on Frege] |
| 9579 | Disregarding properties of two cats still leaves different objects, but what is now the difference? [Frege] |
| 9587 | How do you find the right level of inattention; you eliminate too many or too few characteristics [Frege] |
| 9890 | The modern account of real numbers detaches a ratio from its geometrical origins [Frege] |
| 10803 | Frege himself abstracts away from tone and color [Yablo on Frege] |
| 9855 | Frege's logical abstaction identifies a common feature as the maximal set of equivalent objects [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 10802 | Frege's 'parallel' and 'direction' don't have the same content, as we grasp 'parallel' first [Yablo on Frege] |
| 10526 | Fregean abstraction creates concepts which are equivalences between initial items [Frege, by Fine,K] |
| 10525 | Frege put the idea of abstraction on a rigorous footing [Frege, by Fine,K] |
| 10556 | We create new abstract concepts by carving up the content in a different way [Frege] |
| 9882 | You can't simultaneously fix the truth-conditions of a sentence and the domain of its variables [Dummett on Frege] |
| 9881 | From basing 'parallel' on identity of direction, Frege got all abstractions from identity statements [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 5816 | Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
| 9588 | Number-abstraction somehow makes things identical without changing them! [Frege] |
| 11846 | If we abstract the difference between two houses, they don't become the same house [Frege] |
| 2439 | Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor] |
| 2457 | If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor] |
| 9167 | Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
| 9583 | Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference [Frege] |
| 9584 | Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them [Frege] |
| 2998 | Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor] |
| 2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
| 7307 | A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 4980 | The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege] |
| 3006 | Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor] |
| 2451 | To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor] |
| 22318 | Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter] |
| 3007 | Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor] |
| 3004 | The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor] |
| 16879 | A sign won't gain sense just from being used in sentences with familiar components [Frege] |
| 8646 | Words in isolation seem to have ideas as meanings, but words have meaning in propositions [Frege] |
| 7732 | Never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition [Frege] |
| 8446 | We understand new propositions by constructing their sense from the words [Frege] |
| 9180 | Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 3000 | Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor] |
| 2433 | For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor] |
| 2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
| 3003 | Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor] |
| 12634 | 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor] |
| 2996 | Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor] |
| 4981 | The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence [Frege] |
| 12642 | Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor] |
| 12663 | We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor] |
| 15597 | Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K] |
| 17002 | Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege] |
| 18778 | Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege] |
| 7805 | Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
| 4976 | The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege] |
| 4977 | In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege] |
| 4979 | We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege] |
| 8449 | Senses can't be subjective, because propositions would be private, and disagreement impossible [Frege] |
| 2436 | It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor] |
| 15155 | Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames] |
| 4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
| 2434 | Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor] |
| 12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
| 12645 | Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor] |
| 12646 | Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor] |
| 22280 | Frege's account was top-down and decompositional, not bottom-up and compositional [Frege, by Potter] |
| 7309 | Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 7312 | 'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 11126 | 'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence] |
| 8164 | Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9817 | Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8171 | Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 4954 | Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege] |
| 7304 | Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 2459 | Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor] |
| 4974 | For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege] |
| 16873 | Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege] |
| 16872 | A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege] |
| 19467 | A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege] |
| 19472 | A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege] |
| 16874 | The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege] |
| 9370 | A statement is analytic if substitution of synonyms can make it a logical truth [Frege, by Boghossian] |
| 8743 | Frege considered analyticity to be an epistemic concept [Frege, by Shapiro] |
| 7725 | 'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 20295 | All analytic truths can become logical truths, by substituting definitions or synonyms [Frege, by Rey] |
| 7316 | Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
| 2515 | Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege] |
| 10358 | Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them [Kusch] |
| 2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
| 12627 | Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor] |
| 10333 | Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower [Kusch] |
| 8619 | To learn something, you must know that you don't know [Frege] |
| 10351 | Natural kinds are social institutions [Kusch] |
| 8656 | The laws of number are not laws of nature, but are laws of the laws of nature [Frege] |
| 3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |
| 10332 | Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept [Kusch] |
| 3307 | Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
| 7741 | The predicate 'exists' is actually a natural language expression for a quantifier [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 22286 | Existence is not a first-level concept (of God), but a second-level property of concepts [Frege, by Potter] |
| 8644 | Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for God fails [Frege] |
| 8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |