310 ideas
| 7623 | For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value [Putnam] |
| 12644 | Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor] |
| 2352 | The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam] |
| 12633 | Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor] |
| 2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
| 2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
| 6782 | Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam] |
| 6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
| 6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
| 2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
| 2463 | A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor] |
| 12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
| 2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
| 6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
| 4714 | Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
| 2435 | Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor] |
| 17962 | The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest] |
| 6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
| 7617 | Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam] |
| 6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
| 4716 | The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
| 8828 | Truth is rational acceptability [Putnam] |
| 7616 | Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam] |
| 18951 | For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam] |
| 6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
| 6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
| 6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
| 2345 | Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam] |
| 2347 | Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam] |
| 18953 | Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises [Putnam] |
| 18949 | The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses [Putnam] |
| 18952 | '⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)' [Putnam] |
| 18958 | In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type [Putnam] |
| 9944 | We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam] |
| 9915 | V = L just says all sets are constructible [Putnam] |
| 13655 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that whether all sets are constructible is indeterminate [Putnam, by Shapiro] |
| 18954 | Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations [Putnam] |
| 2442 | Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor] |
| 18956 | Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes [Putnam] |
| 18962 | Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam] |
| 10066 | Putnam coined the term 'if-thenism' [Putnam, by Musgrave] |
| 12664 | A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor] |
| 18961 | We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions [Putnam] |
| 3005 | 'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor] |
| 12648 | Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor] |
| 12650 | 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor] |
| 17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
| 18955 | Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam] |
| 14203 | Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same [Putnam] |
| 14207 | If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth [Putnam] |
| 9913 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is close to an antinomy in philosophy of language [Putnam] |
| 12656 | P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor] |
| 18959 | Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam] |
| 18200 | Very large sets should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam] |
| 9937 | I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam] |
| 9939 | It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam] |
| 3663 | How can you contemplate Platonic entities without causal transactions with them? [Putnam] |
| 9940 | Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam] |
| 9914 | It is unfashionable, but most mathematical intuitions come from nature [Putnam] |
| 9941 | Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam] |
| 18199 | Indispensability strongly supports predicative sets, and somewhat supports impredicative sets [Putnam] |
| 8857 | We must quantify over numbers for science; but that commits us to their existence [Putnam] |
| 12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
| 2349 | Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam] |
| 6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
| 17644 | Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam] |
| 17648 | It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam] |
| 9943 | You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam] |
| 22181 | Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha] |
| 14214 | If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Putnam, by Lewis] |
| 14205 | The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam] |
| 7610 | A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam] |
| 2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
| 7014 | A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties [Fodor] |
| 7618 | Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam] |
| 12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
| 2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
| 18957 | Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam] |
| 2351 | Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam] |
| 18950 | Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors [Putnam] |
| 17643 | Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam] |
| 11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
| 18890 | Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N on Putnam] |
| 4718 | If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
| 10269 | Mathematics eliminates possibility, as being simultaneous actuality in sets [Putnam] |
| 12653 | There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor] |
| 9169 | A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam] |
| 5819 | Conceivability is no proof of possibility [Putnam] |
| 15432 | Structural universals might serve as possible worlds [Forrest, by Lewis] |
| 12651 | Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor] |
| 2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
| 12628 | Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor] |
| 2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
| 3009 | Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals [Fodor] |
| 3008 | Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial [Fodor] |
| 2990 | Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned [Fodor] |
| 6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
| 17642 | The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam] |
| 2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
| 2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
| 2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
| 3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
| 12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
| 12625 | Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor] |
| 2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
| 2462 | Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor] |
| 6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
| 6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
| 7620 | Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself [Putnam] |
| 2454 | We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor] |
| 2455 | Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor] |
| 2460 | Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor] |
| 2461 | An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor] |
| 18960 | Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam] |
| 2458 | Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor] |
| 17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
| 14204 | Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change [Putnam] |
| 17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
| 2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
| 2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
| 12636 | Mental states have causal powers [Fodor] |
| 2994 | In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor] |
| 2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
| 2453 | We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor] |
| 15473 | How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB] |
| 2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
| 2981 | Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor] |
| 7326 | Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things [Fodor] |
| 15494 | We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining [Fodor] |
| 3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
| 3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
| 7705 | The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam] |
| 12661 | The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor] |
| 2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
| 2445 | Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor] |
| 2446 | Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor] |
| 2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
| 2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
| 3460 | Superactors and superspartans count against behaviourism [Putnam, by Searle] |
| 2591 | Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam] |
| 3001 | Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor] |
| 2592 | Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam] |
| 2589 | Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam] |
| 2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
| 2588 | Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam] |
| 5495 | Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan] |
| 2331 | Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam] |
| 2993 | Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor] |
| 12632 | In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor] |
| 3011 | Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor] |
| 5498 | Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Fodor, by Lycan] |
| 2348 | Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam] |
| 2332 | Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam] |
| 2071 | If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam] |
| 2597 | Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor] |
| 2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
| 2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
| 2587 | Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam] |
| 2995 | Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor] |
| 2464 | Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor] |
| 2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
| 2344 | If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam] |
| 2991 | Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor] |
| 2447 | Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor] |
| 2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
| 12624 | Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor] |
| 3002 | If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor] |
| 6376 | Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam] |
| 2330 | If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim] |
| 2598 | Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor] |
| 3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
| 2992 | We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor] |
| 2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
| 12641 | Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor] |
| 12640 | Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor] |
| 2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
| 2074 | Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam] |
| 2988 | Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor] |
| 3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
| 2450 | Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor] |
| 7611 | Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing [Putnam] |
| 2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
| 2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
| 2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
| 2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
| 2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
| 2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
| 22186 | Mental modules are specialised, automatic, and isolated [Fodor, by Okasha] |
| 2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
| 2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
| 2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
| 2605 | If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate! [Putnam] |
| 2606 | No machine language can express generalisations [Putnam] |
| 3010 | Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor] |
| 8090 | Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Fodor, by Devlin] |
| 2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
| 2604 | We must have expressive power BEFORE we learn language [Fodor] |
| 2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
| 2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
| 12643 | Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor] |
| 12649 | We think in file names [Fodor] |
| 12647 | Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor] |
| 3135 | Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey] |
| 12655 | Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor] |
| 2983 | Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor] |
| 12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
| 4099 | If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane] |
| 12026 | We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam] |
| 3208 | Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey] |
| 14200 | 'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam] |
| 2343 | Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam] |
| 12630 | If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor] |
| 2437 | XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor] |
| 3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
| 9168 | I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam] |
| 5820 | 'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam] |
| 7612 | Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam] |
| 2441 | Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor] |
| 3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
| 2999 | Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor] |
| 2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
| 3012 | Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor] |
| 2452 | Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor] |
| 2432 | Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor] |
| 12658 | Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor] |
| 11143 | If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence] |
| 6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
| 2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
| 12662 | We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor] |
| 12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
| 12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
| 12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
| 7613 | Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences [Putnam] |
| 2438 | In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor] |
| 12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
| 2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
| 2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
| 12626 | Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor] |
| 12637 | Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor] |
| 12638 | If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor] |
| 12639 | Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor] |
| 12654 | You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor] |
| 12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
| 12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
| 12659 | Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor] |
| 12660 | One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor] |
| 12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |
| 12629 | For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor] |
| 12631 | Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor] |
| 12657 | Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor] |
| 2439 | Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor] |
| 2457 | If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor] |
| 6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
| 2346 | Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam] |
| 2998 | Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor] |
| 2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
| 6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
| 6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
| 3006 | Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor] |
| 2451 | To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor] |
| 3007 | Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor] |
| 3004 | The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor] |
| 2354 | "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam] |
| 2336 | Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam] |
| 2334 | Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam] |
| 2335 | Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam] |
| 3000 | Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor] |
| 2433 | For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor] |
| 2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
| 3003 | Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor] |
| 12634 | 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor] |
| 2996 | Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor] |
| 6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
| 12642 | Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor] |
| 12663 | We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor] |
| 2340 | We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam] |
| 2341 | Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam] |
| 17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
| 9170 | We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference [Putnam] |
| 14202 | Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference [Putnam] |
| 14201 | Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term [Putnam] |
| 2339 | Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam] |
| 2338 | Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam] |
| 3893 | Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton] |
| 2436 | It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor] |
| 6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
| 2434 | Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor] |
| 12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
| 12645 | Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor] |
| 12646 | Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor] |
| 2459 | Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor] |
| 2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
| 6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
| 2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
| 5817 | Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer [Putnam] |
| 6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
| 6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
| 14206 | There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct' [Putnam] |
| 6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
| 12627 | Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor] |
| 7624 | The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam] |
| 11191 | The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds [Putnam] |
| 17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
| 2342 | "Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam] |
| 11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |
| 17645 | An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam] |
| 11192 | If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Putnam, by Williams,NE] |
| 11190 | Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff [Putnam] |
| 5818 | If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O [Putnam] |
| 3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |