620 ideas
5540 | Cleverness is shown in knowing what can reasonably be asked [Kant] |
6200 | Wisdom is knowing the highest good, and conforming the will to it [Kant] |
21422 | Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom [Kant] |
21955 | My dogmatic slumber was first interrupted by David Hume [Kant] |
6207 | What fills me with awe are the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me [Kant] |
12644 | Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor] |
5631 | Reason is only interested in knowledge, actions and hopes [Kant] |
6184 | Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher [Kant] |
21406 | Because there is only one human reason, there can only be one true philosophy from principles [Kant] |
5635 | In ordinary life the highest philosophy is no better than common understanding [Kant] |
16931 | Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic [Kant] |
21954 | Metaphysics is a systematic account of everything that can be known a priori [Kant] |
7918 | Kant turned metaphysics into epistemology, ignoring Aristotle's 'being qua being' [Kant, by Macdonald,C] |
21438 | Metaphysics might do better to match objects to our cognition (and not start with the objects) [Kant] |
16611 | You just can't stop metaphysical speculation, in any mature mind [Kant] |
5586 | The voyage of reason may go only as far as the coastline of experience reaches [Kant] |
21462 | It is still possible to largely accept Kant as a whole (where others must be dismantled) [Kant, by Gardner] |
5600 | Human reason considers all knowledge as belonging to a possible system [Kant] |
21457 | Reason has two separate objects, morality and freedom, and nature, which ultimately unite [Kant] |
3722 | Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples [Kant] |
9752 | Kant showed that theoretical reason cannot give answers to speculative metaphysics [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
6584 | A priori metaphysics is fond of basic unchanging entities like God, the soul, Forms, atoms… [Kant, by Fogelin] |
9349 | A dove cutting through the air, might think it could fly better in airless space (which Plato attempted) [Kant] |
6203 | Metaphysics is just a priori universal principles of physics [Kant] |
21408 | For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant] |
12767 | Kant exposed the illusions of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic [Kant, by Fraassen] |
12633 | Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor] |
9350 | Our reason mostly analyses concepts we already have of objects [Kant] |
5530 | Analysis of our concepts is merely a preparation for proper a priori metaphysics [Kant] |
18259 | Analysis is becoming self-conscious about our concepts [Kant] |
2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
5604 | In reason things can only begin if they are voluntary [Kant] |
5622 | The boundaries of reason can only be determined a priori [Kant] |
5623 | If I know the earth is a sphere, and I am on it, I can work out its area from a small part [Kant] |
21416 | Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant] |
5578 | Pure reason deals with concepts in the understanding, not with objects [Kant] |
5603 | Pure reason exists outside of time [Kant] |
5628 | Reason hates to be limited in its speculations [Kant] |
5616 | Pure reason is only concerned with itself because it deals with understandings, not objects [Kant] |
21054 | Reason enables the unbounded extension of our rules and intentions [Kant] |
18236 | Reason keeps asking why until explanation is complete [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
3738 | The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end [Kant] |
21439 | Religion and legislation can only be respected if they accept free and public examination [Kant] |
5584 | All objections are dogmatic (against propositions), or critical (against proofs), or sceptical [Kant] |
2463 | A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor] |
2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
5565 | Proof of the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found [Kant] |
5563 | The principle of sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience in time [Kant] |
5602 | The free dialectic opposition of arguments is an invaluable part of the sceptical method [Kant] |
5618 | Definitions exhibit the exhaustive concept of a thing within its boundaries [Kant] |
18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
5619 | No a priori concept can be defined [Kant] |
12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
5577 | Transcendental ideas require unity of the subject, conditions of appearance, and objects of thought [Kant] |
23696 | Transcendental cognition is that a priori thought which shows how the a priori is applicable or possible [Kant] |
22274 | 'Transcendent' is beyond experience, and 'transcendental' is concealed within experience [Kant, by Potter] |
5555 | Philosophical examples rarely fit rules properly, and lead to inflexibility [Kant] |
2435 | Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor] |
5539 | We must presuppose that truth is agreement of cognition with its objects [Kant] |
5620 | Philosophy has no axioms, as it is just rational cognition of concepts [Kant] |
18794 | Logic has precise boundaries, and is the formal rules for all thinking [Kant] |
22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
2442 | Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor] |
12664 | A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor] |
3005 | 'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor] |
12648 | Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor] |
12650 | 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor] |
5542 | There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic [Kant] |
12656 | P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor] |
21454 | The battle of the antinomies is usually won by the attacker, and lost by any defender [Kant] |
16918 | Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts [Kant] |
8739 | Geometry studies the Euclidean space that dictates how we perceive things [Kant, by Shapiro] |
16930 | Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality [Kant] |
16919 | Geometry rests on our intuition of space [Kant] |
8740 | Geometry would just be an idle game without its connection to our intuition [Kant] |
16899 | Geometrical truth comes from a general schema abstracted from a particular object [Kant, by Burge] |
16920 | Numbers are formed by addition of units in time [Kant] |
16929 | 7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12 [Kant] |
9632 | Kant only accepts potential infinity, not actual infinity [Kant, by Brown,JR] |
3343 | Euclid's could be the only viable geometry, if rejection of the parallel line postulate doesn't lead to a contradiction [Benardete,JA on Kant] |
8737 | Kant suggested that arithmetic has no axioms [Kant, by Shapiro] |
5557 | Axioms ought to be synthetic a priori propositions [Kant] |
12421 | Kant's intuitions struggle to judge relevance, impossibility and exactness [Kitcher on Kant] |
16910 | Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure [Kant] |
16917 | All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time [Kant] |
17617 | Maths is a priori, but without its relation to empirical objects it is meaningless [Kant] |
16928 | Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant] |
12458 | Kant taught that mathematics is independent of logic, and cannot be grounded in it [Kant, by Hilbert] |
2795 | If 7+5=12 is analytic, then an infinity of other ways to reach 12 have to be analytic [Kant, by Dancy,J] |
4475 | Saying a thing 'is' adds nothing to it - otherwise if my concept exists, it isn't the same as my concept [Kant] |
12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
7416 | Kant is read as the phenomena being 'contrained' by the noumenon, or 'free-floating' [Talbot on Kant] |
19386 | Without the subject or the senses, space and time vanish, as their appearances disappear [Kant] |
21445 | Even the most perfect intuition gets no closer to things in themselves [Kant] |
21448 | Categories are general concepts of objects, which determine the way in which they are experienced [Kant] |
5554 | Categories are necessary, so can't be implanted in us to agree with natural laws [Kant] |
6160 | Does Kant say the mind imposes categories, or that it restricts us to them? [Rowlands on Kant] |
2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
7014 | A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties [Fodor] |
12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
17772 | Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic [Kant, by Bayne] |
2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
17619 | We renounce all abstract entities [Goodman/Quine] |
5533 | Objects in themselves are not known to us at all [Kant] |
21449 | The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience [Kant] |
5550 | A substance could exist as a subject, but not as a mere predicate [Kant] |
21451 | All appearances need substance, as that which persists through change [Kant] |
5564 | Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change [Kant] |
11833 | The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant] |
5626 | An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience [Kant] |
7576 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is true of concepts with identical properties, but not of particulars [Kant, by Jolley] |
14509 | If we ignore differences between water drops, we still distinguish them by their location [Kant] |
18797 | Modalities do not augment our concepts; they express their relation to cognition [Kant] |
5594 | Natural necessity is the unconditioned necessity of appearances [Kant] |
5566 | Is the possible greater than the actual, and the actual greater than the necessary? [Kant] |
5613 | The analytic mark of possibility is that it does not generate a contradiction [Kant] |
21410 | That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant] |
12653 | There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor] |
18795 | A concept is logically possible if non-contradictory (but may not be actually possible) [Kant] |
6181 | Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition [Kant] |
18796 | Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary [Kant] |
16256 | For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Kant, by Maudlin] |
5524 | Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience [Kant] |
23461 | Kant thought worldly necessities are revealed by what maths needs to make sense [Kant, by Morris,M] |
14710 | Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Kant, by Schroeter] |
20944 | Knowledge is threefold: apprehension, reproduction by imagination, recognition by concepts [Kant, by Bowie] |
21957 | 'Transcendental' concerns how we know, rather than what we know [Kant] |
5617 | Knowledge begins with intuitions, moves to concepts, and ends with ideas [Kant] |
15627 | Kant showed that the understanding (unlike reason) concerns what is finite and conditioned [Kant, by Hegel] |
16898 | Understanding essentially involves singular elements [Kant, by Burge] |
5573 | Reason is distinct from understanding, and is the faculty of rules or principles [Kant] |
5634 | Opinion is subjectively and objectively insufficient; belief is subjective but not objective; knowledge is both [Kant] |
12651 | Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor] |
2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
12628 | Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor] |
5590 | 'I think therefore I am' is an identity, not an inference (as there is no major premise) [Kant] |
5601 | There are possible inhabitants of the moon, but they are just possible experiences [Kant] |
22003 | We have no sensual experience of time and space, so they must be 'ideal' [Kant, by Pinkard] |
21456 | Objects having to be experiencable is not the same as full idealism [Gardner on Kant] |
21446 | If we disappeared, then all relations of objects, and time and space themselves, disappear too [Kant] |
6909 | In Kantian idealism, objects fit understanding, not vice versa [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
16923 | I admit there are bodies outside us [Kant] |
6910 | Kant's idealism is a limited idealism based on the viewpoint of empiricism [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
21440 | For Kant experience is either structured like reality, or generates reality's structure [Kant, by Gardner] |
22006 | The concepts that make judgeable experiences possible are created spontaneously [Kant, by Pinkard] |
21441 | 'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience [Kant] |
21442 | 'Transcendental' cognition concerns what can be known a priori of its mode [Kant] |
5568 | We cannot know things in themselves, but are confined to appearances [Kant] |
5581 | We have proved that bodies are appearances of the outer senses, not things in themselves [Kant] |
21956 | Everything we intuit is merely a representation, with no external existence (Transcendental Idealism) [Kant] |
2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
21971 | Transcendental philosophy is the subject becoming the originator of unified reality [Kant] |
9156 | Kant's shift of view enables us to see a priority in terms of mental capacity, not truth and propositions [Burge on Kant] |
7575 | A priori knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience [Kant, by Jolley] |
12414 | A priori knowledge occurs absolutely independently of all experience [Kant] |
9351 | One sort of a priori knowledge just analyses given concepts, but another ventures further [Kant] |
9348 | Experienceless bodies have space; propertyless bodies have substance; this must be seen a priori [Kant] |
21081 | We are equipped with the a priori intuitions needed for the concept of right [Kant] |
3009 | Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals [Fodor] |
3008 | Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial [Fodor] |
2990 | Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned [Fodor] |
5404 | Two plus two objects make four objects even if experience is impossible, so Kant is wrong [Russell on Kant] |
9345 | Propositions involving necessity are a priori, and pure a priori if they only derive from other necessities [Kant] |
16893 | The apriori is independent of its sources, and marked by necessity and generality [Kant, by Burge] |
9347 | A priori knowledge is indispensable for the possibility and certainty of experience [Kant] |
3342 | Seeing that only one parallel can be drawn to a line through a given point is clearly synthetic a priori [Kant, by Benardete,JA] |
3726 | The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant] |
20943 | Kant bases the synthetic a priori on the categories of oneness and manyness [Kant, by Bowie] |
5402 | Kant showed that we have a priori knowledge which is not purely analytic [Kant, by Russell] |
5203 | We can think of 7 and 5 without 12, but it is still a contradiction to deny 7+5=12 [Ayer on Kant] |
16916 | A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves [Kant] |
5527 | That a straight line is the shortest is synthetic, as straight does not imply any quantity [Kant] |
5528 | That force and counter-force are equal is necessary, and a priori synthetic [Kant] |
5529 | The real problem of pure reason is: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? [Kant] |
5537 | That two lines cannot enclose a space is an intuitive a priori synthetic proposition [Kant] |
5546 | Are a priori concepts necessary as a precondition for something to be an object? [Kant] |
5558 | 7+5=12 is not analytic, because 12 is not contained in 7 or 5 or their combination [Kant] |
5624 | We possess synthetic a priori knowledge in our principles which anticipate experience [Kant] |
5571 | Reason contains within itself certain underived concepts and principles [Kant] |
5403 | If, as Kant says, arithmetic and logic are contributed by us, they could change if we did [Russell on Kant] |
5525 | No analysis of the sum of seven and five will in itself reveal twelve [Kant] |
18262 | For Kant analytic knowledge needs complex concepts, but the a priori can rest on the simple [Coffa on Kant] |
16915 | A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant] |
5526 | With large numbers it is obvious that we could never find the sum by analysing the concepts [Kant] |
16914 | A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility [Kant] |
5567 | A priori the understanding can only anticipate possible experiences [Kant] |
18264 | We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour [Kant] |
21447 | I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant] |
5532 | Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject [Kant] |
16924 | I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant] |
16913 | I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant] |
2774 | Kant says the cognitive and sensory elements in experience can't be separated [Kant, by Dancy,J] |
23454 | Appearances have a 'form', which indicates a relational order [Kant] |
2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
5569 | We cannot represent objects unless we combine concepts with intuitions [Kant] |
2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
23697 | I exist just as an intelligence aware of its faculty for combination [Kant] |
22005 | Associations and causes cannot explain content, which needs norms of judgement [Kant, by Pinkard] |
3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
12625 | Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor] |
6577 | For Kant, our conceptual scheme is disastrous when it reaches beyond experience [Kant, by Fogelin] |
16925 | Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience [Kant] |
5538 | Understanding has no intuitions, and senses no thought, so knowledge needs their unity [Kant] |
5559 | Sensations are a posteriori, but that they come in degrees is known a priori [Kant] |
2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
8736 | Kantian intuitions are of particulars, and they give immediate knowledge [Kant, by Shapiro] |
16911 | Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant] |
18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
5541 | A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided [Kant] |
7070 | Kant says knowledge is when our representations sufficiently conform to our concepts [Kant, by Critchley] |
2462 | Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor] |
4708 | Kant thought he had refuted scepticism, but his critics say he is a sceptic, for rejecting reality [O'Grady on Kant] |
5595 | Scepticism is absurd in maths, where there are no hidden false assertions [Kant] |
5592 | Scepticism is the euthanasia of pure reason [Kant] |
6578 | For Kant, experience is relative to a scheme, but there are no further possible schemes [Kant, by Fogelin] |
2454 | We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor] |
2455 | Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor] |
2460 | Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor] |
2461 | An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor] |
5629 | If a proposition implies any false consequences, then it is false [Kant] |
2458 | Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor] |
15308 | Science is the reduction of diverse forces and powers to a smaller number that explain them [Kant] |
2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
12636 | Mental states have causal powers [Fodor] |
2994 | In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor] |
2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
5606 | Freedom and natural necessity do not contradict, as they relate to different conditions [Kant] |
4086 | Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception') [Kant, by Crane] |
2453 | We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor] |
15473 | How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB] |
2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
2981 | Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor] |
7326 | Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things [Fodor] |
15494 | We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining [Fodor] |
3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
2869 | Kant's only answer as to how synthetic a priori judgements are possible was that we have a 'faculty'! [Nietzsche on Kant] |
9346 | Judgements which are essentially and strictly universal reveal our faculty of a priori cognition [Kant] |
5572 | Reason has logical and transcendental faculties [Kant] |
22443 | We are seldom aware of imagination, but we would have no cognition at all without it [Kant] |
12661 | The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor] |
21421 | Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price [Kant] |
5627 | I can express the motion of my body in a single point, but that doesn't mean it is a simple substance [Kant] |
9751 | To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
21450 | Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it [Kant] |
2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
5583 | We need an account of the self based on rational principles, to avoid materialism [Kant] |
5570 | Self-knowledge can only be inner sensation, and thus appearance [Kant] |
5551 | I have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself [Kant] |
21452 | I can only determine my existence in time via external things [Kant] |
5582 | As balls communicate motion, so substances could communicate consciousness, but not retain identity [Kant] |
2965 | For Kant the self is a purely formal idea, not a substance [Kant, by Lockwood] |
5549 | Mental representations would not be mine if they did not belong to a unified self-consciousness [Kant] |
5596 | We must assume an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself [Kant] |
3739 | Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes [Kant] |
3741 | We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible [Kant] |
21053 | The manifest will in the world of phenomena has to conform to the laws of nature [Kant] |
9756 | We must be free, because we can act against our strongest desires [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
5597 | If there is a first beginning, there can be other sequences initiated from nothing [Kant] |
3740 | We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant] |
5296 | Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
5585 | Soul and body connect physically, or by harmony, or by assistance [Kant] |
2445 | Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor] |
2446 | Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor] |
2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
5630 | Our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative [Kant] |
5589 | Neither materialism nor spiritualism can reveal the separate existence of the soul [Kant] |
3001 | Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor] |
2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
2993 | Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor] |
12632 | In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor] |
3011 | Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor] |
5498 | Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Fodor, by Lycan] |
2597 | Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor] |
2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
2995 | Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor] |
2464 | Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor] |
2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
2447 | Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor] |
2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
12624 | Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor] |
2991 | Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor] |
3002 | If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor] |
2598 | Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor] |
3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
12641 | Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor] |
2992 | We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor] |
2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
12640 | Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor] |
5556 | A pure concept of the understanding can never become an image [Kant] |
2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
24011 | Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Kant, by Williams,B] |
2988 | Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor] |
3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
8687 | Kantian 'intuition' is the bridge between pure reason and its application to sense experiences [Kant, by Friend] |
2450 | Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor] |
21759 | Kant deduced the categories from our judgements, and then as preconditions of experience [Kant, by Houlgate] |
19655 | Kant says we can describe the categories of thought, but Hegel claims to deduce them [Kant, by Meillassoux] |
5552 | Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances [Kant] |
5544 | Four groups of categories of concept: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality [Kant] |
5547 | The categories are objectively valid, because they make experience possible [Kant] |
22186 | Mental modules are specialised, automatic, and isolated [Fodor, by Okasha] |
2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
12643 | Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor] |
8090 | Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Fodor, by Devlin] |
3010 | Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor] |
2604 | We must have expressive power BEFORE we learn language [Fodor] |
12647 | Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor] |
12649 | We think in file names [Fodor] |
3135 | Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey] |
12655 | Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor] |
2983 | Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor] |
12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
2437 | XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor] |
12630 | If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor] |
3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
2441 | Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor] |
2999 | Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor] |
3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
3012 | Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor] |
2452 | Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor] |
2432 | Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor] |
17616 | Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind [Kant] |
5553 | Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible [Kant] |
5593 | Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding [Kant] |
22004 | Concepts are rules for combining representations [Kant, by Pinkard] |
5543 | All human cognition is through concepts [Kant] |
12658 | Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor] |
16912 | Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause [Kant] |
2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
11143 | If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence] |
6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
12662 | We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor] |
12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
2438 | In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor] |
12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
12626 | Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor] |
12637 | Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor] |
12638 | If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor] |
12639 | Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor] |
12654 | You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor] |
8735 | Kant implies that concepts have analysable parts [Kant, by Shapiro] |
12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
12659 | Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor] |
12660 | One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor] |
12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |
12629 | For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor] |
12631 | Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor] |
12657 | Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor] |
2439 | Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor] |
2457 | If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor] |
2998 | Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor] |
2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
3006 | Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor] |
2451 | To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor] |
3007 | Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor] |
3004 | The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor] |
2433 | For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor] |
2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
3000 | Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor] |
3003 | Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor] |
12634 | 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor] |
2996 | Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor] |
12642 | Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor] |
12663 | We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor] |
2436 | It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor] |
12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
12645 | Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor] |
12646 | Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor] |
2434 | Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor] |
2459 | Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor] |
8734 | Non-subject/predicate tautologies won't fit Kant's definition of analyticity [Shapiro on Kant] |
7314 | How can bachelor 'contain' unmarried man? Are all analytic truths in subject-predicate form? [Miller,A on Kant] |
16926 | Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject [Kant] |
16927 | Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject [Kant] |
20291 | If the predicate is contained in the subject of a judgement, it is analytic; otherwise synthetic [Kant] |
20292 | Analytic judgements clarify, by analysing the subject into its component predicates [Kant] |
2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
6183 | Can pure reason determine the will, or are empirical conditions relevant? [Kant] |
6191 | The will is the faculty of purposes, which guide desires according to principles [Kant] |
21059 | General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them [Kant] |
12627 | Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor] |
6190 | The sole objects of practical reason are the good and the evil [Kant] |
12157 | Kant gave form and status to aesthetics, and Hegel gave it content [Kant, by Scruton] |
20346 | The aesthetic attitude is a matter of disinterestedness [Kant, by Wollheim] |
18547 | Only rational beings can experience beauty [Kant, by Scruton] |
24172 | It is hard to see why we would have developed Kant's 'disinterested' aesthetic attitude [Cochrane on Kant] |
20408 | With respect to the senses, taste is an entirely personal matter [Kant] |
20409 | When we judge beauty, it isn't just personal; we judge on behalf of everybody [Kant] |
20411 | Saying everyone has their own taste destroys the very idea of taste [Kant] |
24170 | Kant thinks beauty ignores its objects, because it is only 'form' engaging with mind [Cochrane on Kant] |
22711 | The beautiful is not conceptualised as moral, but it symbolises or resembles goodness [Kant, by Murdoch] |
4025 | Kant saw beauty as a sort of disinterested pleasure, which has become separate from the good [Kant, by Taylor,C] |
20412 | Beauty is only judged in pure contemplation, and not with something else at stake [Kant] |
22046 | The mathematical sublime is immeasurable greatness; the dynamical sublime is overpowering [Kant, by Pinkard] |
21458 | The sublime is a moral experience [Kant, by Gardner] |
5643 | Aesthetic values are not objectively valid, but we must treat them as if they are [Kant, by Scruton] |
20410 | The judgement of beauty is not cognitive, but relates, via imagination, to pleasurable feelings [Kant] |
5599 | Without God, creation and free will, morality would be empty [Kant] |
21415 | Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant] |
5074 | Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R on Kant] |
8024 | The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant] |
18235 | Only human reason can confer value on our choices [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
22390 | Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot on Kant] |
21409 | Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant] |
6196 | People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous [Kant] |
9750 | We must only value what others find acceptable [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
20160 | Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant] |
5576 | We cannot derive moral laws from experience, as it is the mother of illusion [Kant] |
9749 | Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
7671 | Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin] |
18675 | Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness [Orsi on Kant] |
22007 | An autonomous agent has dignity [Würde], which has absolute worth [Kant, by Pinkard] |
18234 | The good will is unconditionally good, because it is the only possible source of value [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
6192 | Good or evil cannot be a thing, but only a maxim of action, making the person good or evil [Kant] |
18239 | What is contemplated must have a higher value than contemplation [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
18238 | Only a good will can give man's being, and hence the world, a final purpose [Kant] |
21431 | The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant] |
21437 | All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant] |
21455 | We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature [Kant] |
3717 | Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love [Kant] |
3720 | We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses [Kant] |
21429 | The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant] |
3712 | A good will is not good because of what it achieves [Kant] |
3725 | The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences [Kant] |
6197 | Morality involves duty and respect for law, not love of the outcome [Kant] |
6193 | Our happiness is all that matters, not as a sensation, but as satisfaction with our whole existence [Kant] |
1452 | Happiness is the condition of a rational being for whom everything goes as they wish [Kant] |
1454 | Morality is not about making ourselves happy, but about being worthy of happiness [Kant] |
21061 | Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will [Kant] |
3733 | The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties [Kant] |
22442 | If lies were ever acceptable, with would undermine all duties based on contract [Kant] |
3736 | Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends [Kant] |
6194 | The highest worth for human beings lies in dispositions, not just actions [Kant] |
6198 | Virtue is the supreme state of our pursuit of happiness, and so is supreme good [Kant] |
21411 | A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end [Kant] |
21413 | Virtue is strong maxims for duty [Kant] |
21414 | The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends [Kant] |
3544 | Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas] |
1456 | Moral law is holy, and the best we can do is achieve virtue through respect for the law [Kant] |
21436 | We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable [Kant] |
21419 | If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant] |
21417 | How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant] |
21420 | If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant] |
21418 | There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects [Kant] |
7674 | Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin] |
21029 | Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Kant, by Sandel] |
21425 | We can love without respect, and show respect without love [Kant] |
21428 | Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right [Kant] |
21426 | Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance [Kant] |
21427 | Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons [Kant] |
21430 | Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends [Kant] |
21434 | We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal [Kant] |
7105 | If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman] |
7625 | We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant] |
4024 | Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant] |
3710 | The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant] |
3737 | The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant] |
3715 | Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant] |
20715 | It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant] |
3718 | Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience [Kant] |
21060 | It can't be a duty to strive after the impossible [Kant] |
3735 | Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal [Kant] |
3714 | Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed [Kant] |
5295 | Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
3724 | A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake [Kant] |
3723 | There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law [Kant] |
6695 | Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Kant, by Graham] |
8028 | Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre on Kant] |
22441 | The law will protect you if you tell a truth which results in murder [Kant] |
6187 | Universality determines the will, and hence extends self-love into altruism [Kant] |
8026 | Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant] |
6185 | No one would lend money unless a universal law made it secure, even after death [Kant] |
3716 | Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law [Kant] |
4413 | The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche on Kant] |
15673 | The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Kant, by Finlayson] |
8068 | Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe on Kant] |
8025 | The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre on Kant] |
3762 | Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill on Kant] |
8027 | I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre on Kant] |
3728 | Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [Kant, by PG] |
22008 | Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means [Kant] |
22009 | Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends [Kant] |
3719 | If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible [Kant] |
3727 | Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature [Kant] |
3731 | Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself [Kant] |
22050 | The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Kant, by Bowie] |
6694 | Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only [Kant] |
6201 | Everyone (even God) must treat rational beings as ends in themselves, and not just as means [Kant] |
3711 | Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness [Kant] |
3713 | The function of reason is to produce a good will [Kant] |
5605 | Moral blame is based on reason, since a reason is a cause which should have been followed [Kant] |
5632 | Moral laws are commands, which must involve promises and threats, which only God could provide [Kant] |
4345 | For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Kant, by Hursthouse] |
4251 | If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B on Kant] |
16004 | If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard on Kant] |
3729 | Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them [Kant] |
4344 | Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth [Kant] |
6186 | A holy will is incapable of any maxims which conflict with the moral law [Kant] |
6195 | Reason cannot solve the problem of why a law should motivate the will [Kant] |
21062 | The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law [Kant] |
6916 | For Kant, essence is mental and a mere idea, and existence is the senses and mere appearance [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
21412 | Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant] |
21435 | Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant] |
21075 | The state of nature always involves the threat of war [Kant] |
3732 | Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant] |
21071 | There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights [Kant] |
21082 | A power-based state of nature may not be unjust, but there is no justice without competent judges [Kant] |
21063 | Personal contracts are for some end, but a civil state contract involves a duty to share [Kant] |
21068 | There must be a unanimous contract that citizens accept majority decisions [Kant] |
21069 | A contract is theoretical, but it can guide rulers to make laws which the whole people will accept [Kant] |
20569 | Kant made the social contract international and cosmopolitan [Kant, by Oksala] |
21070 | A law is unjust if the whole people could not possibly agree to it [Kant] |
21079 | The a priori general will of a people shows what is right [Kant] |
21077 | Each nation should, from self-interest, join an international security constitution [Kant] |
21078 | A constitution must always be improved when necessary [Kant] |
21067 | A citizen must control his own life, and possess property or an important skill [Kant] |
21089 | Monarchs have the highest power; autocrats have complete power [Kant] |
21086 | Hereditary nobility has not been earned, and probably won't be earned [Kant] |
21064 | A lawful civil state must embody freedom, equality and independence for its members [Kant] |
5575 | An obvious idea is a constitution based on maximum mutual freedom for citizens [Kant] |
21055 | Our aim is a constitution which combines maximum freedom with strong restraint [Kant] |
21056 | The vitality of business needs maximum freedom (while avoiding harm to others) [Kant] |
21080 | Actions are right if the maxim respects universal mutual freedoms [Kant] |
21083 | Women have no role in politics [Kant] |
21058 | Enlightenment requires the free use of reason in the public realm [Kant] |
7670 | Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Kant, by Berlin] |
5621 | The existence of reason depends on the freedom of citizens to agree, doubt and veto ideas [Kant] |
21407 | Equality is not being bound in ways you cannot bind others [Kant] |
21076 | Equality is where you cannot impose a legal obligation you yourself wouldn't endure [Kant] |
21066 | Citizens can rise to any rank that talent, effort and luck can achieve [Kant] |
20570 | There is now a growing universal community, and violations of rights are felt everywhere [Kant] |
20571 | There are political and inter-national rights, but also universal cosmopolitan rights [Kant] |
21065 | You can't make a contract renouncing your right to make contracts! [Kant] |
21084 | In the contract people lose their rights, but immediately regain them, in the new commonwealth [Kant] |
21090 | If someone has largely made something, then they own it [Kant] |
21057 | The highest ideal of social progress is a universal cosmopolitan existence [Kant] |
21087 | Human life is pointless without justice [Kant] |
7591 | Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton on Kant] |
21088 | Justice asserts the death penalty for murder, from a priori laws [Kant] |
7673 | Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Kant, by Berlin] |
21433 | Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution [Kant] |
21072 | The people (who have to fight) and not the head of state should declare a war [Kant] |
21073 | Hiring soldiers is to use them as instruments, ignoring their personal rights [Kant] |
21074 | Some trust in the enemy is needed during wartime, or peace would be impossible [Kant] |
21085 | The church has a political role, by offering a supreme power over people [Kant] |
19739 | The maxim for suicide is committed to the value of life, and is thus contradictory [Kant] |
6188 | A permanent natural order could not universalise a rule permitting suicide [Kant] |
3730 | Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends [Kant] |
21423 | Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons [Kant] |
21424 | Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans [Kant] |
22052 | Kant's nature is just a system of necessary laws [Bowie on Kant] |
8256 | Kant identifies nature with the scientific picture of it as the realm of law [Kant, by McDowell] |
22053 | The Critique of Judgement aims for a principle that unities humanity and nature [Kant, by Bowie] |
5591 | Reason must assume as necessary that everything in a living organism has a proportionate purpose [Kant] |
18237 | Without men creation would be in vain, and without final purpose [Kant] |
5615 | Extension and impenetrability together make the concept of matter [Kant] |
14560 | A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause [Kant] |
5545 | Appearances give rules of what usually happens, but cause involves necessity [Kant] |
9755 | The concept of causality entails laws; random causality is a contradiction [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
17709 | We judge causation by relating events together by some law of nature [Kant, by Mares] |
5562 | Experience is only possible because we subject appearances to causal laws [Kant] |
5523 | Causation obviously involves necessity, so it cannot just be frequent association [Kant] |
19669 | For Kant the laws must be necessary, because contingency would destroy representation [Kant, by Meillassoux] |
19672 | Kant fails to prove the necessity of laws, because his reasoning about chance is over-ambitious [Meillassoux on Kant] |
3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |
16922 | Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles [Kant] |
17736 | We can't learn of space through experience; experience of space needs its representation [Kant] |
5531 | Space is an a priori necessary basic intuition, as we cannot imagine its absence [Kant] |
16921 | If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left [Kant] |
5536 | If space and time exist absolutely, we must assume the existence of two pointless non-entities [Kant] |
5534 | One can never imagine appearances without time, so it is given a priori [Kant] |
5560 | The three modes of time are persistence, succession and simultaneity [Kant] |
5535 | That times cannot be simultaneous is synthetic, so it is known by intuition, not analysis [Kant] |
5561 | If time involved succession, we must think of another time in which succession occurs [Kant] |
3721 | We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection [Kant] |
5633 | We don't accept duties as coming from God, but assume they are divine because they are duties [Kant] |
8046 | We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [Kant, by MacIntyre] |
6199 | Obligation does not rest on the existence of God, but on the autonomy of reason [Kant] |
5607 | Only three proofs of God: the physico-theological (evidence), the cosmological (existence), the ontological (a priori) [Kant] |
13732 | Kant never denied that 'exist' could be a predicate - only that it didn't enlarge concepts [Kant, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
8451 | Existence is merely derived from the word 'is' (rather than being a predicate) [Kant, by Orenstein] |
3321 | Modern logic says (with Kant) that existence is not a predicate, because it has been reclassified as a quantifier [Benardete,JA on Kant] |
5608 | Is "This thing exists" analytic or synthetic? [Kant] |
5609 | If 'this exists' is analytic, either the thing is a thought, or you have presupposed its existence [Kant] |
5610 | If an existential proposition is synthetic, you must be able to cancel its predicate without contradiction [Kant] |
5611 | Being is not a real predicate, that adds something to a concept [Kant] |
5612 | You add nothing to the concept of God or coins if you say they exist [Kant] |
20714 | God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Kant, by Davies,B] |
1453 | We have to postulate something outside nature which makes happiness coincide with morality [Kant] |
1455 | Belief in justice requires belief in a place for justice (heaven), a time (eternity), and a cause (God) [Kant, by PG] |
5598 | If you prove God cosmologically, by a regress in the sequences of causes, you can't abandon causes at the end [Kant] |
6205 | To know if this world must have been created by God, we would need to know all other possible worlds [Kant] |
6204 | Using God to explain nature is referring to something inconceivable to explain what is in front of you [Kant] |
6206 | From our limited knowledge we can infer great virtues in God, but not ultimate ones [Kant] |
6202 | In all naturalistic concepts of God, if you remove the human qualities there is nothing left [Kant] |