249 ideas
12644 | Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor] |
12633 | Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor] |
2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
2463 | A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor] |
12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
2435 | Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor] |
2442 | Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor] |
12664 | A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor] |
3005 | 'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor] |
12648 | Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor] |
12650 | 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor] |
12656 | P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor] |
20457 | Zeno assumes collecting an infinity of things makes an infinite thing [Rovelli] |
12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
20468 | Quantum mechanics deals with processes, rather than with things [Rovelli] |
20467 | Quantum mechanics describes the world entirely as events [Rovelli] |
2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
7014 | A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties [Fodor] |
12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
12653 | There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor] |
20146 | 'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains [Kekes] |
12651 | Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor] |
2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
12628 | Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor] |
2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
3009 | Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals [Fodor] |
3008 | Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial [Fodor] |
2990 | Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned [Fodor] |
2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
12625 | Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor] |
2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
23101 | Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations [Kekes] |
2462 | Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor] |
2460 | Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor] |
2454 | We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor] |
2455 | Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor] |
2461 | An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor] |
2458 | Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor] |
2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
12636 | Mental states have causal powers [Fodor] |
2994 | In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor] |
2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
2453 | We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor] |
15473 | How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB] |
2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
2981 | Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor] |
7326 | Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things [Fodor] |
15494 | We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining [Fodor] |
3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
12661 | The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor] |
2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
2445 | Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor] |
2446 | Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor] |
2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
3001 | Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor] |
2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
2993 | Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor] |
12632 | In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor] |
3011 | Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor] |
5498 | Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Fodor, by Lycan] |
2597 | Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor] |
2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
2995 | Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor] |
2464 | Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor] |
2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
2447 | Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor] |
2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
12624 | Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor] |
2991 | Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor] |
3002 | If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor] |
2598 | Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor] |
3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
2992 | We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor] |
2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
12641 | Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor] |
12640 | Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor] |
2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
2988 | Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor] |
3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
2450 | Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor] |
2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
22186 | Mental modules are specialised, automatic, and isolated [Fodor, by Okasha] |
2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
3010 | Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor] |
8090 | Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Fodor, by Devlin] |
2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
2604 | We must have expressive power BEFORE we learn language [Fodor] |
12643 | Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor] |
2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
12649 | We think in file names [Fodor] |
12647 | Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor] |
3135 | Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey] |
12655 | Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor] |
2983 | Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor] |
12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
2437 | XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor] |
12630 | If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor] |
3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
2441 | Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor] |
2999 | Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor] |
3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
3012 | Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor] |
2452 | Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor] |
2432 | Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor] |
12658 | Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor] |
11143 | If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence] |
6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
12662 | We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor] |
12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
2438 | In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor] |
12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
12626 | Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor] |
12637 | Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor] |
12638 | If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor] |
12639 | Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor] |
12654 | You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor] |
12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
12659 | Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor] |
12660 | One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor] |
12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |
12629 | For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor] |
12631 | Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor] |
12657 | Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor] |
2439 | Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor] |
2457 | If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor] |
2998 | Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor] |
2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
3006 | Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor] |
2451 | To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor] |
3007 | Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor] |
3004 | The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor] |
3000 | Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor] |
2433 | For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor] |
2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
3003 | Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor] |
12634 | 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor] |
2996 | Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor] |
12642 | Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor] |
12663 | We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor] |
2436 | It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor] |
2434 | Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor] |
12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
12645 | Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor] |
12646 | Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor] |
2459 | Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor] |
2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
20169 | An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes] |
20149 | To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes] |
12627 | Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor] |
23086 | Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions [Kekes] |
23100 | Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy [Kekes] |
19738 | Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes] |
20145 | Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes] |
23087 | Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes] |
23089 | Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes] |
23093 | Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes] |
23098 | Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes] |
20170 | Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes] |
23096 | Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes] |
23095 | Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes] |
23094 | Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes] |
20165 | Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes] |
20171 | Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes] |
20175 | If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes] |
23090 | Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes] |
20174 | Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes] |
20156 | We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes] |
20150 | There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes] |
20158 | Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes] |
20159 | Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes] |
20161 | The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes] |
20151 | Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes] |
20152 | Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes] |
20153 | Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes] |
23117 | Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes] |
23119 | Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes] |
20162 | Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes] |
23088 | Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes] |
23097 | What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes] |
20154 | Control is the key to well-being [Kekes] |
20157 | Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes] |
23099 | It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character [Kekes] |
23118 | Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes] |
20173 | Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting [Kekes] |
20172 | Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate [Kekes] |
20155 | Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us [Kekes] |
23109 | The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations [Kekes] |
23114 | The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life [Kekes] |
20164 | The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past... [Kekes] |
20163 | Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program [Kekes] |
23116 | Citizenship is easier than parenthood [Kekes] |
23103 | Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation [Kekes] |
23107 | Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice [Kekes] |
23081 | Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy [Kekes] |
23085 | The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy [Kekes] |
23092 | Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy [Kekes] |
23102 | Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees [Kekes] |
23084 | Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality? [Kekes] |
23079 | Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice [Kekes] |
23091 | Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic? [Kekes] |
23112 | Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil [Kekes] |
23082 | Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors [Kekes] |
23106 | To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives [Kekes] |
23121 | It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others [Kekes] |
23105 | It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires [Kekes] |
23120 | The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality [Kekes] |
20148 | Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied [Kekes] |
23108 | Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert [Kekes] |
23083 | Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert [Kekes] |
23113 | Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations [Kekes] |
20469 | There are probably no infinities, and 'infinite' names what we do not yet know [Rovelli] |
20461 | The basic ideas of fields and particles are merged in quantum mechanics [Rovelli] |
3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |
20462 | Because it is quantised, a field behaves like a set of packets of energy [Rovelli] |
20463 | There are about fifteen particles fields, plus a few force fields [Rovelli] |
20464 | The world consists of quantum fields, with elementary events happening in spacetime [Rovelli] |
20459 | Electrons only exist when they interact, and their being is their combination of quantum leaps [Rovelli] |
20460 | Electrons are not waves, because their collisions are at a point, and not spread out [Rovelli] |
20466 | Quantum Theory describes events and possible interactions - not how things are [Rovelli] |
20465 | Nature has three aspects: granularity, indeterminacy, and relations [Rovelli] |
20458 | The world is just particles plus fields; space is the gravitational field [Rovelli] |
20470 | Only heat distinguishes past from future [Rovelli] |