Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for John Austin, Thoralf Skolem and David Liggins

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18 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
14231 We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
17325 Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
17318 Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
17879 Axiomatising set theory makes it all relative [Skolem]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
13536 Skolem did not believe in the existence of uncountable sets [Skolem]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
14232 We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong [Liggins]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
17878 If a 1st-order proposition is satisfied, it is satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain [Skolem]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
17880 Integers and induction are clear as foundations, but set-theory axioms certainly aren't [Skolem]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
17881 Mathematician want performable operations, not propositions about objects [Skolem]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
17320 Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17326 The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17327 Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
17322 Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
14233 Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
17324 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17321 Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins]
17323 If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
20930 The existence of law is one thing, its merits and demerits another [Austin,J]