16 ideas
1403 | A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG] |
19079 | For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO] |
19076 | Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO] |
19077 | Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO] |
19078 | Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO] |
19084 | Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO] |
19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |
19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |
16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
16726 | Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan] |
16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
19074 | Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO] |
19082 | Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO] |
8659 | The gods alone live forever with Shamash. The days of humans are numbered. [Anon (Gilg)] |