14 ideas
1403 | A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG] |
18470 | Maybe truth-making is an unanalysable primitive, but we can specify principles for it [Smith,B] |
18469 | God might necessitate that something happen, but He is not the truth-maker for it [Smith,B] |
16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
16726 | Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan] |
16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
2534 | Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon] |
2537 | Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon] |
2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
2533 | Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon] |
2535 | The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon] |
2536 | Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon] |