12 ideas
| 1403 | A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG] |
| 16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
| 11993 | Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung] |
| 11997 | A property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another [Kung] |
| 11992 | Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung] |
| 16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
| 23559 | We have the concept of 'knowledge' as a label for good informants [Craig, by Fricker,M] |
| 16726 | Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan] |
| 16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
| 16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
| 11995 | Some peripheral properties are explained by essential ones, but don't themselves explain properties [Kung] |
| 11996 | Some non-essential properties may explain more than essential-but-peripheral ones do [Kung] |