Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for John Buridan, Gabriel M.A. Segal and Charlotte Witt

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3123 Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
3125 Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
1403 A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
16678 Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
12066 Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
12067 An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
12082 If unity is a matter of degree, then essence may also be a matter of degree [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
12089 Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
16793 A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
12102 Essential properties of origin are too radically individual for an Aristotelian essence [Witt]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
3105 Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
3106 If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
16726 Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
16577 Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
16576 Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
3113 The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3112 Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
3108 If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
3110 Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
3124 Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3117 Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
3104 Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
3103 Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
3111 Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
3109 If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
3116 Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
3121 If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
3118 If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
3119 Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
12085 Reality is directional [Witt]