Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for John Buridan, H. Paul Grice and James Pryor

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

26 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
22140 The greatest philosophers are methodical; it is what makes them great [Grice]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
1403 A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
16678 Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
16793 A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
13856 Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington]
8948 The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher]
13767 Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
10990 Conditionals are truth-functional, but unassertable in tricky cases? [Grice, by Read]
14277 A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
16726 Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
8845 An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
8842 The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8843 Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor]
8844 Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
8846 Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
8847 Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
16577 Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
16576 Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
7752 Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice]
7751 Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice]
7753 We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
22330 Grice said patterns of use are often semantically irrelevant, because it is a pragmatic matter [Grice, by Glock]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
18045 Grice's maxim of quality says do not assert what you believe to be false [Grice, by Magidor]
18044 Grice's maxim of manner requires one to be as brief as possible [Grice, by Magidor]
10991 Key conversational maxims are 'quality' (assert truth) and 'quantity' (leave nothing out) [Grice, by Read]
18046 Grice's maxim of quantity says be sufficiently informative [Grice, by Magidor]