Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for John Buridan, Harold Noonan and George Bealer

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20 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
It is controversial whether only 'numerical identity' allows two things to be counted as one [Noonan]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
I could have died at five, but the summation of my adult stages could not [Noonan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Stage theorists accept four-dimensionalism, but call each stage a whole object [Noonan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Identity definitions (such as self-identity, or the smallest equivalence relation) are usually circular [Noonan]
Identity is usually defined as the equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law [Noonan]
Problems about identity can't even be formulated without the concept of identity [Noonan]
Identity can only be characterised in a second-order language [Noonan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law must be kept separate from the substitutivity principle [Noonan]
Indiscernibility is basic to our understanding of identity and distinctness [Noonan]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer]
Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer]