Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for John Buridan, Jens Zimmermann and Allan Gibbard

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26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
We take part in objective truth, rather than observe it from a distance [Zimmermann,J]
Hermeneutic knowledge is not objective, but embraces interpretations [Zimmermann,J]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
In phenomenology, all perception is 'seeing as' [Zimmermann,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
The hermeneutic circle is between the reader's self-understanding, and the world of the text [Zimmermann,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural law theorists fear that without morality, law could be based on efficiency [Zimmermann,J]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 2. Judaism
Traditionally, God dictated the Torah to Moses, unlike the later biblical writings [Zimmermann,J]