14 ideas
| 1403 | A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG] |
| 16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
| 16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
| 16726 | Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan] |
| 16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
| 16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
| 9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 20327 | Modern attention has moved from the intrinsic properties of art to its relational properties [Lamarque/Olson] |
| 20326 | Early 20th cent attempts at defining art focused on significant form, intuition, expression, unity [Lamarque/Olson] |
| 20330 | The dualistic view says works of art are either abstract objects (types), or physical objects [Lamarque/Olson] |