17 ideas
1403 | A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG] |
19086 | Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth] |
14970 | Normal system K has five axioms and rules [Cresswell] |
14971 | D is valid on every serial frame, but not where there are dead ends [Cresswell] |
14972 | S4 has 14 modalities, and always reduces to a maximum of three modal operators [Cresswell] |
14973 | In S5 all the long complex modalities reduce to just three, and their negations [Cresswell] |
14976 | Reject the Barcan if quantifiers are confined to worlds, and different things exist in other worlds [Cresswell] |
19093 | Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth] |
14974 | A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc [Cresswell] |
16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
14975 | A de dicto necessity is true in all worlds, but not necessarily of the same thing in each world [Cresswell] |
16726 | Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan] |
16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
19088 | For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth] |