Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for John Buridan, Plotinus and Robert Kirk

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37 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Being is the product of pure intellect [Plotinus]
The One does not exist, but is the source of all existence [Plotinus]
The One is a principle which transcends Being [Plotinus]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
Number determines individual being [Plotinus]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
If soul was like body, its parts would be separate, without communication [Plotinus]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
The movement of Soul is continuous, but we are only aware of the parts of it that are sensed [Plotinus]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
A person is the whole of their soul [Plotinus]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Our soul has the same ideal nature as the oldest god, and is honourable above the body [Plotinus]
The soul is outside of all of space, and has no connection to the bodily order [Plotinus]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R]
Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
The Soul reasons about the Right, so there must be some permanent Right about which it reasons [Plotinus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Ecstasy is for the neo-Platonist the highest psychological state of man [Plotinus, by Feuerbach]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
How can multiple existence arise from the unified One? [Plotinus]
Because the One is immobile, it must create by radiation, light the sun producing light [Plotinus]
Soul is the logos of Nous, just as Nous is the logos of the One [Plotinus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
Soul is author of all of life, and of the stars, and it gives them law and movement [Plotinus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Even the soul is secondary to the Intellectual-Principle [Nous], of which soul is an utterance [Plotinus]