Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for John Buridan, Ronald Dworkin and Achille Varzi

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21 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi]
Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi]
There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi]
'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Dworkin believed we should promote equality, to increase autonomy [Dworkin, by Kekes]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
We can treat people as equals, or actually treat them equally [Dworkin, by Grayling]
Treating people as equals is the one basic value of all plausible political theories [Dworkin, by Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
If we assess what people would buy in an imaginary insurance market, our taxes could copy it [Dworkin, by Kymlicka]